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ON Saturday morning the President cabled to Mr. Tumulty saying that the covenant would be part of the Treaty of Peace. On Sunday morning M. Pichon told the newspaper men that there would be two treaties—a preliminary and a permanent—and that the covenant would not appear in the first except in the form of general principles. On Sunday morning the American Commission was reported to be very much surprised by what M. Pichon had said. By Monday the covenant had become an appendix, and the Americans were denying that there would be any difference between a preliminary and permanent treaty. What does all this mean? Can it be that at this late date, when everybody is reported as hurrying to produce a peace, these basic matters are still undecided? Americans have no way of knowing, because of the secrecy with which the conference conducts its business. Now the reason given for secrecy was that differences of opinion could be more easily ironed out, and the public spared the humiliating spectacle of watching diplomats quarrel. But up to the present time the public has not been spared.

THERE are two issues involved in the question of including the text of the covenant. One concerns Europe, the other America. The European question is this: Will the Continental Allies renounce strategic annexations and accept instead the security offered by a League of Nations? The American question is this: Will the United States ratify the League of Nations if the treaty of peace depends upon it? The answer to both questions turns on the terms of the peace treaty. If those terms are based on the premise of a League of Nations, then the matter of the inclusion of the covenant is important only from the point of view of American domestic politics. In that case, the difference is merely one of procedure in Europe and of tactics in America. But if the real question at issue between the President and M. Pichon is the nature of the peace itself, then the very existence of the League is at stake. If M. Pichon is trying to make a strategic and annexationist peace, as if no League were going to exist, then Mr. Wilson is really fighting to save the League itself. For if the League is in fact nothing but an appendix to an old-fashioned military peace, then no one who regards the interests of America would be willing to join it. America can never ratify a covenant which guarantees a peace that violates the intention of the covenant, because such an arrangement would in truth be what the skeptics have called a League to Enforce War.

BUT if M. Pichon and Mr. Wilson both advocate the kind of peace and the kind of League which the world has come to expect, then it is of slight consequence which procedure is adopted. So long as the treaty depends upon the League, it does not matter whether they are printed in one document or two. Provided they are integrally related, they will form a single moral obligation and cannot be separated by any honorable government. So if France renounces her strategic claims on the left bank of the Rhine as a part of the treaty because she trusts to the League, then

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the Senate cannot kill the League and leave France without the protection of either. If Italy abandons the spoils of victory in order to gain the fruits of the League, America cannot cheat her by denying her the protection both of the old and of the new guarantees. The League is a substitute for military annexations, and the nations are compelled to choose between them.

MR. POINDEXTER, though a member of the American rather than the French Senate, has already chosen for France. Item one: "The American people, however, are for France." Item two: France needs the League more than America. "This is certainly true." Item three: "Our wise statesmen have always refused to share the burdens of Europe." Item four: Let us make a separate peace with Germany. As a method of being "for France" this is superb. It consists in saying: "We are for you, Joan of Arc, Lafayette, and Marshal Foch. You are the most gallant people in the world. We shall always remember you affectionately, but the less we have to do with you the better. In the meantime, as proof of our undying friendship we shall make a separate peace with the enemy."

WE agree in substance with the criticism which Mr. William Hard passes in a communication printed elsewhere upon Article X of the proposed constitution of the League of Nations. That article violates the formative principle of the covenant by committing the members of the League to a specific pledge to act in a certain way in advance of consultation and irrespective of the effects of their action. The article may well serve to build a sanctuary for reactionary and exclusive nationalism in what is supposed to be the very temple of cooperative nationalism. It will work, so far as it works at all, in favor of international inflexibility and Toryism. But we do not feel justified, because of this and other objections to the proposed constitution, in agitating for its rejection unless it is amended to meet this and other criticisms. The effect of the guarantee by the League of the territorial integrity of its members will largely depend upon the nature of the boundaries established by the treaty of peace. If in running the new boundaries the Peace Conference exhibits a living belief in the principle of national self-determination and a plain desire to reduce international friction from this source to a minimum, the guarantee of territorial integrity against external aggression would look far less ominous than it does at present. On the other hand the running of boundaries, dictated chiefly by strategic considerations, would compel intelligent liberals to oppose any constitution of a League of Nations which contained guarantees of the territorial integrity of its members. Pending, however, the announcement of the terms of the treaty of peace, we cannot follow the course suggested by Mr. Hard. Its adoption by American liberals might turn the tide of public opinion against a League of Nations. By declaring an irreconcilable objection to the proposed covenant they would class themselves in the popular mind with those agitators who are now using criticism of the present draft for the purpose of discrediting the whole project.

IT is impossible to believe that so talented a diplomat as Viscount Ishii is unaware of the depth of the aversion of the Amercian people to the principle of international control of immigration policies—an aversion we share with Canada and Australia. Viscount Ishii knows that rather than surrender our right to determine what peoples may be permitted to establish themselves as permanent residents among us, we would refuse to join the League of Nations. Therefore in pressing the issue of race discrimination under our immigration laws, Viscount Ishii must be working either with those Japanese statesmen who are trying to kill the League, or with those who are laying a basis for compensatory amendments to the League covenant, such as the explicit recognition of the so-called Monroe Doctrine of Eastern Asia. We are inclined to accept the latter interpretation. The right of Japanese laborers to settle in America is worth next to nothing to Japan. She could not relieve her excess of population—growing at the rate of a million a year—by sending a few hundreds of thousands to America. A League of Nations, on the other hand, is worth everything to Japan. Under permanent peace her commercial and industrial position in the East will inevitably become one of undisputed paramountcy. Would she so easily attain to such a position if other nations saw in the economic progress of Japan a most serious military menace? That is not likely.

DISCRIMINATION on account of race is an abominable thing. But do the Japanese who protest so vehemently over our Oriental immigration laws really believe that race is the essence of the matter? Where one race detests another, it is usually the more self-conscious classes, the so-called higher classes that give the clearest evidence of the fact. But the Japanese gentleman is received with the cordiality that his charm and breeding com-

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mand. Oriental exclusion has always been with us an economic, not a social or racial question. In our economic conflict between labor and capital, fair play required us to deny to capital the huge advantage that it would have derived from free access to the greatest source of cheap contract labor in the world. If the Japanese of the more prosperous classes consider that our exclusion of the coolie reflects upon them, they have a sure, if a slow method of bringing us to the point where we shall regard such exclusion as absurd. Let them bring their labor laws up to western standards, grant to labor the legal right to form unions and conduct peaceable strikes, and raise wages to a level comparing favorably with ours.

NEITHER Republican nor Democratic leaders can afford to "compromise" the well-considered Davenport-Donohue Health Insurance Bill now pending in the New York legislature. Workmen's health insurance, including maternity benefits, is the logical supplement to workmen's compensation. The present moderate proposal is contrasted with the enlightened protection already provided for workers and their families in European countries, particularly in England. Organized labor has unanimously placed health insurance first among its immediate legislative demands. Governor Smith in his message recognized that "nothing is so devastating in the life of the worker's family as sickness," and strongly urged the enactment of such a law. Chairman Elkus of the state reconstruction commission has emphasized health insurance as "immediately" important. And an impressive array of civic societies, far-sighted employers and physicians have come to the support of the bill. Legislative commissions in four states, after investigating sickness among workers, have reached the conclusion that the only just and effective solution of the problem is health insurance legislation. The Pennsylvania commission discloses the startling fact that illness in that state alone causes a wage loss of $33,000,000 every year, while medical protection for wage earners is conspicuously inadequate. The health insurance legislation recommended by the Ohio commission coincides in all essentials with the provisions of the New York bill. Just as workmen's compensation is needed to protect the working population against industrial accidents, health insurance is needed to protect them against the far greater hazard of sickness. Congress adjourned without taking any action. The states must step into the breach—above all the pivotal state of New York. The health insurance bill is the most important measure now before the legislators and the people of New York state. It should be passed without compromise, evasion or delay.

CORRESPONDENTS from Oshkosh, Wisconsin, state that Mr. Roger E. Simmons, in addressing a Forum audience in that city, expressed himself recently as follows: "I travelled with the reporter for the New Republic on his way to Russia. He said he was going into Russia to justify Bolshevism. He knew it would advance the cause of his paper and help him to do that." In reporting such a conversation Mr. Simmons was giving currency to a lie. The New Republic has never sent a reporter to Russia for the purpose of justifying Bolshevism. It has never published a line from an authorized correspondent in Russia. It is and always has been as much opposed to Bolshevism as an ideal of social change or as a method of bringing it about as is, for instance, Colonel Raymond Robins. Some liar has deceived Mr. Simmons and has tempted him to deceive his audience. He is under a clear obligation to name the reporter and corroborate the story or cease to circulate it.

THE office of Custodian of Alien Property has proposed a plan of dealing with the confiscated German patents in the chemical industry which offers a suggestion for wider reforms. These patents, according to the plan, shall be available for all producers, upon payment of a stipulated fee. Why should not all patents be handled in the same way? Our industrial history is full of instances of valuable inventions left practically unutilized throughout the life of the patent because the inventor has been unable to finance them himself or find a financier who would take them for more than a song. Other inventors have wasted the chief part of their efforts and wealth in fighting infringements. Eli Whitney got nothing out of the cotton gin. Juries would not convict men charged with infringing a patent covering the making of a machine absolutely vital to the cotton industry. Free use of a patent in return for a fee or royalty could be made more profitable to the inventor and vastly more beneficial to the public than the present system of monopoly. It would also greatly advance the national interest in the competitive struggle for foreign markets.

Peace by Ultimatum

THE Allied governments and people have about reached the culminating stage of their deliberations in Paris. Hitherto the Peace Conference has settled nothing. After months of hesi-

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tation it has only just agreed upon a practicable method of accomplishing the urgently necessary task of feeding Germany and Central Europe. It managed to give birth to a tentative policy with respect to Russia which has since died in the arms of its parents. The decision to organize a League of Nations and to weave into it the fabric of the treaty has been announced, and a constitution framed and published, but even this decision is not treated as irrevocable. The constitution itself consisted chiefly of a machinery of consultation and coordination and avoided the attempt to define a body of common law, which, if adopted, would bind the nations more securely together. In reaching this decision, consequently, they did not decide much. No one of the major Powers, the United States included, has agreed to renounce its own favorite imperialistic policies. The European nations have negotiated chiefly for the purpose of securing the best terms for themselves rather than for that of satisfying fundamental common needs of all the peoples. It has not been an edifying spectacle, but it is about over. The day of decision is rapidly arriving. During the next few weeks the Conference must reach and publish a cartload of findings about armaments, economic relations, indemnities and boundaries which will provide the stuff of the treaty of peace. And the day of the published decision will also be the day of judgment. The democracies of the world will finally possess the material for judging whether their rulers have or have not deprived them of the fruits of their sufferings and sacrifices since 1914.

The indications which have been allowed to leak out as to the probable nature of their decisions are not encouraging. It looks as if they would consist at bottom of a colossal bargain, in which the conflicting national demands of the victorious European governments and their satellites will be compromised and pooled. We hope most devoutly that the prophecy of such a bargain will prove to be false, but unfortunately the cables from Paris sufficiently justify its utterance. They have announced recently that the pernicious Treaty of London which provides for inevitable friction between Greece and Italy and South Slavia and Italy is still considered binding on its signatories. They have foreshadowed the imposition of terms on Germany which if they are accepted by the National Assembly would ultimately cause the downfall of that body as the source of political authority in Germany. The anticipation that a bargain of this kind is concealed behind the deplorable secrecy, in which to an increasing extent the negotiations in Paris have been shrouded, is already changing the attitude of some of our European friends towards President Wilson. Mr. William Allen White reports since the President's return a noticeable increase of his popularity among government officials and a noticeable diminution of it among the people.

That the day of the published decision will reveal the existence of some such bargain is also prophesied by the increasing demand for haste in the execution of the treaty. All the Paris correspondents insist on the need of the early restoration of a legal state of peace. Otherwise, they allege, there can be no restoration of confidence, no resumption of economic and social activity and no security for public order. Europe is moving towards anarchy because its people do not know what to expect and do not dare to plan for the future. The prevailing account of European unrest and its intolerable results is no doubt true, and no doubt, also, an assured peace and only that will avail to exorcise the threat. But when the consequences of unrest are alleged as a sufficient excuse for the immediate adoption of a treaty, none of the essential details of which have been divulged, it begins to look as if there might be another reason for haste. The treaty is intended to weave a durable fabric of European and perhaps of more than European international relations. The future happiness of millions of people depends on the wisdom and the success of its arrangements. The diplomats have worked on it for months under conditions of profound secrecy. Shall not popular opinion be allowed to work on it at all? The policy which the cables from Paris foreshadow is that of announcing the treaty in all its detail at one time and then imposing it on Germany and on the rest of the world without opportunity for careful consideration. It looks as if the Allied statesmen, hopeless of agreement upon a settlement, which will sustain the pressure of close and prolonged scrutiny, are using the crying need of social stability to force the immediate adoption of a settlement, the sufficient discussion of which will not be permitted. They will present it to the German delegates for ratification without delay and without revision, and the procedure which will prevent the Germans from offering objections to it will condemn public opinion in the Allied countries to a similar disability. The war began in an ultimatum to Russia which proved to be a peremptory challenge not merely to Russia but to all democratic people, to popular liberties in all countries. Can a victorious democracy afford to bring it to a successful end by issuing an equally peremptory ultimatum to Germany? The ultimatum is a weapon not of democracy but of autocracy, not of constructive politics but of anarchic militarism. Just as the German General Staff challenged the German among other democracies by the ultimatum to Russia so it looks as if

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the War Council in Paris proposed to challenge the Allied democracies by an ultimatum to Germany. Will the people in the Allied countries follow the example of the German democrats?

If the Allied statesmen wish to construct a stable peace—a peace which assuages the causes of unrest and which lulls the suspicion and satisfies the conscience of the peoples—a peremptory ultimatum is not the best method of accomplishing this result. Desirable as it is to sweep away the legal state of war, the quick and forced signing of the treaty will not under the extraordinary existing conditions create peace any more than the signing of the armistice created peace. As the New Republic has so often insisted military victory, essential as it was, was not sufficient to solve the problem of a durable peace. Before Germany surrendered war raged in Europe. Since the German surrender what is supposed to be peace has equally raged in Europe. The Allied statesmen have as yet made little headway in translating their military victory into the promised political and social benefits. Their inability to make headway is born of the disagreements among themselves as to the nature of the political and social ideals vindicated by their victory. Because of this disagreement they have during the last four months hesitated, wrangled, protested, bargained and screened their deliberations from the world, but peace among themselves as well as with their former enemies has never passed from words into deeds. We all know that the disagreements continued unabated. The popular unrest which possesses the European peoples and the anarchy which threatens their future welfare is to a considerable extent the reflection of this anarchy in political principle. The Peace Conference could not make up its mind either to accept a constructive democratic solution or reject it. The time has now come when it must act and the question is whether its action will evade or meet the need of a morally integrated political victory.

By acting according to the procedure now prophesied the allied statesmen will not dictate peace, they will dictate the assurance of future war. They will render a League of Nations as distinguished from an unholy alliance impossible. They will arouse suspicion and the resentment of the workers of all nations, and at least in the case of the British this resentment will assume early and vigorous expression. The treaty they spring upon the world would become the source rather than the cure of European anarchy and social distress. There is no need of adopting such a drastic procedure. The need of restoring stability to Europe is not a sufficient excuse for insisting on peace by ultimatum. To be sure, some action must be taken and taken quickly to restore confidence, but the way to restore the kind of a confidence that counts is to permit the resumption of normal social and economic activity during the period of peace deliberations. The Allied governments could have relaxed the blockade and done much to stimulate business activity without loosening their grip on Germany. They can still accomplish much by such means, but they must act promptly and effectively and they must indicate at the same time a clear determination to consider their decision to form a League of Nations equivalent to a decision to abandon the spoils system and to recognize the principles of no annexations, no punitive indemnities and the self-determination of peoples. Such a policy would soon produce a healing and a soothing effect. It would allay popular suspicions, restore industrial employment, and create an atmosphere in which the obstacles to organized public order could gradually be deprived of their power of obstruction.

Insisting on American Sovereignty

CRITICS of the proposed constitution of the League of Nations, such as Senators Borah and Reed, are persistently accusing it of one unforgivable and egregious offense against the American people. It impairs American sovereignty. It limits the exercise by the American nation of any ultimate freedom of choice. The American people, according to these gentlemen, depend for their safety and welfare upon their legal franchise under all conditions to do what is right in the eyes of their own government. That legal franchise is embodied in the sovereign discretion of the American nation to act as a wholly independent political unit. In so far as they submit to any impairment of their national sovereignty the American people will bring disaster upon themselves without doing any good to the rest of the world.

That the opponents of the proposed constitution should accuse it of offending in this particular respect affords a convincing illustration of the purely instinctive and uncritical nature of their opposition to the League. The weakness of the official draft as an effective legal instrument of the political objects which the League needs and is being organized to accomplish consists, not in the extent to which it impairs the sovereignty of the subscribing nations, but the extent to which it leaves their sovereign discretion intact. The only agency set up by the proposed constitution which tends towards international government is the Executive Council, and Mr. Taft is fully justified in

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insisting upon the almost negligible ability of the Council to issue orders binding upon the members of the League. The Council is essentially an agency of mediation, of conference and of coordination rather than of government. The idea underlying its functions is that of perpetuating the present Peace Congress and in this way of providing an agency for keeping the peace which the Allies are now making in Paris. But it is not proposed to keep the peace by vesting full power to dispose of the moral and physical force of the League in the Council or any other executive body. The constitution provides every precaution against an offense to legitimate national susceptibilities. Its authors have pinned their hopes for future pacification upon the salutary effect of delay, of publicity, of investigation, of discussion and of conference in adjusting differences. They are assuming that during a period in which so much indispensable world legislation must be written and in which the conscience of mankind has such compelling reasons to abhor war as a method of international adjustment, legalized processes of international cooperation can be made to work.

The American opponents of the League are criticizing the proposed constitution for the offense which its authors were most anxious and took most pains to avoid. By joining the League the American nation would not be compromising its legal sovereignty in any way that it has not already done, explicitly and implicitly, by participating in a European War and by entering the Peace Conference. What Knox, Borah, Reed and Co. are fighting against is not a proposal to impair American sovereignty but a cautious, tentative experimental attempt to adjust American sovereign independence to the equally sovereign independence of other nations. Every statesman realizes that the theoretical legal franchise of the American government to do what is right in its own eyes is not an operative rule of international conduct. Americans always have adjusted and must continue to adjust their national policy to the policy of other nations, and they must use investigation, publicity and conference as a means of learning what other peoples need or want and of deciding what adjustments to make. The League under its proposed constitution substitutes for diplomacy an organized conference in a particular place as the regular agency of dealing with the common affairs of the nations; and it seeks in addition to place behind the decisions of such a conference some measure of security and some kind of sanction. But the sanction is more moral than physical, and the members of the League retain every guarantee of their sovereign independence which is not incompatible with an honest experiment in cooperation. Such being its nature, it is no wonder that an agitation against a machinery of international consultation which only embodies in a covenant the practices of civilized peoples and tentatively penalizes their violation drives its perpetrators towards appeals to irresponsible national chauvinism. If the American national interest and independence is endangered and invidiously curtailed by such a cautious promise to recognize plain obligations to other nations, American sovereignty is something which other nations are justified in disliking and distrusting.

Amendment of the proposed covenant in order to meet the kind of criticism which the Senators have lavished on it would deprive it of any integrity of purpose and any promise of successful operation. The amendments look for the most part in the direction of explicitly guaranteeing theoretical American sovereignty or of explicitly safeguarding some formerly fundamental part of American foreign policy such as the Monroe Doctrine. Such reservations and provisos would be either useless or maleficent. If they meant that the American nation did not sincerely intend to adjust its national interests and policy to those of other nations and to the generally accepted standards of international right, they would be maleficent. They would afford future American governments a legal pretext to ignore in their foreign policies those essential interests which are common to all free peoples. Other nations would claim the same privilege and their covenant to live together and keep the peace would become a marriage of convenience, uncemented by any sufficient sense of mutual obligation. On the other hand, if the proposed safeguards do not provide a legal pretext which American government could use in ignoring its obligations to the peoples of other countries and to the achieved standards of international association why add them to the covenant? The civilized nations are not suffering from a morbid sense of mutual obligation. They are in no danger of an immediate or an early subjection to international authority. The danger lies all the other way. They are suffering from an excess of irresponsible nationalism and from a deficiency of international organization and control. The proposed constitution limits this irresponsibility only by a somewhat solemn promise to confer and to cooperate. The proposed amendments would rob the covenant of its moral solemnity. It would be one more illustration of the subterfuges whereby Christians have usually escaped the obligations of applied Christianity—that is, by prudently separating the fear of God from any application of the Golden Rule.

Take, for instance, the effect on the covenant of an explicit reservation in favor of the Monroe Doctrine. That Doctrine has always possessed two

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aspects. It was primarily an attempt to establish under the armed protection of the United States an American international society strong enough to keep out European imperialism and divorced from the animosities, the suspicions and the competition for preponderance in power which poisoned the relations of European nations one to another. But because the military and naval guarantee against European aggression was furnished by the United States, it became from another aspect a vague claim on the part of this country to exercise on the American continent a measure of suzerainty and to veto any act of a non-American nation or any agreement between an American and a non-American nation which was considered inimical to our interests. If the proposed covenant prevails, it would make unnecessary any purely American association of nations, the object of which was to keep European imperialism and competition for power out of America. The subscribing European nations agree to renounce those practices which provoked the original proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine. To this extent the covenant does bring into existence a Monroe Doctrine of the world. It places its members under a solemn obligation to avoid those practices which President Monroe wished to banish from the American continent. But precisely because it substitutes a joint sanction for public order in the western hemisphere in place of the naval and military sanction of the United States, it necessarily levels some of those barriers which the United States erected for the protection of the two Americas. The United States cannot fairly claim to reap the benefit of a League of Nations and soft pedal on its obligations. A covenant with the European nations must, if it bring with it responsibilities commensurate with its privileges, at least modify the vague but exclusive suzerainty which it has claimed to exercise in the western hemisphere.

An explicit reservation by the United States in favor of the Monroe Doctrine inserted in the constitution of the League of Nations would both demoralize the League and corrupt the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine. Thereafter we Americans could no longer assert that the Monroe Doctrine served the interests of free people everywhere and acted as a pillar of public order and world peace. The reservation in its favor after the European nations had promised to respect its primary purpose would stamp it as the exclusive national policy of this country. The United States would insist on a sphere of military and political influence in which, with or without the consent of the other American or of European nations, it would brook no interference. The integrity of the League could not survive this apostasy. Other nations would insist on setting up spheres of influence in which they would brook no interference with their national interests. France could on the same grounds justify a demand for a Rhine frontier, Poland for an extension of territory and an annexation of subject populations which would give her a larger measure of security against Russia or Germany, Japan her declaration of a Monroe Doctrine for Asia, and the British Commonwealth for the exercise of exclusive authority during war over the world's maritime highways. In the meantime, any peoples whose interests happened to conflict with the interests of the favored Powers would protest in vain. Germany would have to accept the partial or complete alienation of millions of Germans and Russia of millions of Russians. China would be ordered to accept Japanese suzerainty, whether she liked it or not, and the other American peoples that of the United States. And the British Empire would claim the power of life and death over all countries which traded to any considerable extent on the high seas. What a seemly ending for a war which was begun in part to secure the rights of small nations!

This instance of the Monroe Doctrine illustrates perfectly the effect of admitting into the covenant special reservations in favor of special sovereign rights for individual nations. If the reservation is effective they interfere with the moral authority of the covenant. If the reservation is merely formal, why insist on it? The whole tendency of such a proviso would be to sanction America's international irresponsibility. In the old world, before the war, when national safety depended chiefly or exclusively on the organized national force, American sovereignty was the instrument of American independence and the safeguard of American popular liberties. But in the new world which constructive democracy is trying to erect on the ruins of the old, a world in which national safety and self-respect depend upon organized international co-operation, any insistence on American sovereignty in its former exclusive sense is equivalent to an explicit American protest against the better political aspirations of mankind. During the period of transition it would be unwise for the American nation to tie itself irrevocably to a super-state and if the proposed covenant demanded such a promise it might well be rejected. The fact is that it demands no such promise. It leaves an avenue of retreat open should the experiment fail to succeed. But the experiment should be made, if at all, in good faith, and any reservations in favor of American sovereignty or the Monroe Doctrine would cast doubt upon the sincerity of our adhesion to the covenant. They would constitute a contingent declaration in favor of international anarchy and would compromise the future of popular liberties in this and other countries.

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Back to Work

LET us ignore, for the moment, the war by which Europe and much of the rest of the world were thrown into economic disorder. Our immediate problem is to face the disorder itself as a present evil, demanding prompt and vigorous action if the new era is to be one of real peace. That disorder may be described most simply as a dislocation of unimaginable complexity in the machinery by which the labors of men transmute themselves into the things that satisfy men's needs. At the one extreme we find three hundred million persons in actual want of the necessities of life, or on the verge of want. At the other extreme are the workers, millions upon millions of them, either totally unemployed or employed precariously and ineffectively. How much real work is going on in Russia, Poland, Rumania, Germany and the lands of the former Dual Empire? How near is the production machinery of England, France, Italy, Belgium, Spain, Switzerland to normal functioning? Estimates are always unsafe, but nobody will charge us with a desire to exaggerate if we suggest that the labor power of fifty millions of adults is running to waste like the power of a great waterfall that has thrown off the harness of industry.

And it is this dislocation of production, rather than the unsettled territorial, financial and political questions arising out of the war, that most presses upon the fortunes of the world. The war destroyed, indeed, incalculable sums of wealth. To restore the devastated areas in northern France and Belgium and Italy, in Poland and Galicia and Serbia, is a stupendous undertaking. But the labor of fifty million men and women is a stupendous creative force, if it is wisely organized and directed. The assessing of indemnities, the transfer of territory from one state to another, loom large in the imagination of the conventionally trained statesmen. But indemnities will not be paid until Europe gets back to work. And what will annexations profit a nation torn by internal discontent? Economic disorganization and political unrest are no monopoly of the vanquished. They are forces powerful enough to make victory a mockery.

And let us not delude ourselves with the notion that no more is required than a colossal system of relief works, to tide the nations over the interval until the old order can be restored. The old order was acceptable before the war. The working masses, if not content, were resigned to it. They will not sink back into equally safe resignation. Look at the labor unrest in England. The workers intend to begin life on a new plane, with a more generous satisfaction of their aspirations. If the system of production for private profit is to survive in England, the British captain of industry will have to exhibit an efficiency that makes possible living wages as well as fair profits. He will have to take the duty of a satisfactory accounting to his working people just as seriously as the duty of a satisfactory accounting to his shareholders. It may be said that in the continental countries the demands of labor are not so exigent. The French and Belgian and Italian laborers do not demand so much. Perhaps; but the margin between what they now demand and the little they got before the war is wide—not improbably wider than the margin of fresh demands in England.

Europe must get back to work, and with greatly increased efficiency, to repair the damage of war and to meet the new claims of labor whose repudiation would imperil the whole structure of an economic system based upon private ownership. No statesman can be so blind as not to see that this is necessary. Necessary, but impossible of early realization? Let us see. What are the actual obstacles to the resumption of work?

First we must place definite shortages of food and materials, shortages that can not be overcome in the near future by any effort. There is not on hand a sufficient cereal supply to meet all the requirements of the world. The supply of meat and of edible fats is short. Properly distributed, however, the food supplies are adequate to keep the general populations alive until the next harvest and to give to the laborers sufficient to sustain their working energies. There is an absolute shortage of wool and leather which can not be wholly made good for years, but want of clothes and shoes has never yet produced a revolution. Practically everything else that is essential to life can be produced by present labor. The supplies of fuel and of the chief industrial metals are capable of rapid expansion. Organizing energy is the one thing requisite to setting in motion the process of rebuilding and extending railroads and highways, of reconstructing factories and equipping them with machinery. The wastes of war penetrated to the heart of every state of Europe. Everywhere there are buildings and machinery to be repaired or replaced, indispensable preparations to be made for economic expansion. Opportunity for employment is universal.

But the transportation problem? To be sure; the world's tonnage is at a low level; the railways of Europe are badly battered, and in modern production transportation is an essential link in most processes. The world's tonnage, however, has just been enlarged by three and a half million tons of German shipping, out of which we could already have got four months' use if the representatives of the Powers had been more of statesmen and less of politicians. Assuming that for the future it

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is recognized that no interest of profit makers, no nationalistic interest shall stand in the way of the common purpose of getting the world back to work, our present means of transportation would suffice tolerably, under a rigid system of priorities.

The essential obstacles to a resumption of work are not physical, but political and financial. The case is one that requires international confidence and cooperation; but the world is filled with national jealousies and suspicions. Belgium needs machinery to take the place of that lost through German pillage. Germany has an excess of capacity to produce machinery. America has the food without which the Germans can produce nothing. But would Belgium be willing to furnish employment to Germany through orders for machinery? Would America be willing to furnish food to Germany to enable her to supply Belgium with machinery we might otherwise supply? France is rebuilding the factories in the cities of the devastated zone. Looking to the future everybody sees clearly that these factories ought to be as well located and as well equipped with machinery as the best in the world. Only so can France compete in the world market and meet the just claims of her workers to a higher standard of living. But what if French industry can not turn out as efficient machinery as British, American or German industry? Shall France, in seeking to make employment, patch up her factory equipment as well as she can with domestic labor and make up for the resultant inefficiency by protective duties? That is what she is doing.

Because of national separatism, the labor fund of Europe, which ought to be administered temporarily at least as a common resource, is seriously crippled in its effectiveness. There is an even greater difficulty to be overcome, however. That is the general disintegration of the credit structure. Rumania, for example, needs food and seed and fertilizers. She needs railways and roads and bridges. She has hosts of men unemployed, who ought to be set at the work of agriculture and improvement. But she has no present resources with which to pay for the supplies and materials she needs. Public and private credit alike lie deep in the shadow of Bolshevism.

How good is the public or the private credit of any state east of the Rhine and the Isonzo? How complete is the confidence of the average business man in the credit of some of the states west of that line? And yet Europe can not get back to work unless credit is freely given. Before goods fit to serve as a means of payment can be produced, food and materials must be supplied. And beyond this fact, most of the immediate opportunities for employment yield not movable goods, suitable for international payment, but fixed improvements—railways, buildings and the like, whose value is premised upon economic stability and political order.

It is a risky thing to grant credit to most of the peoples of Europe; it is a more risky thing to refuse it, and accept the consequences of increasing unrest and disorder. So, when the whole of the industry of a country is tottering over a panic, it is unsafe for banks to extend credit and unsafe for them to withhold it and run the risk of going down in the common ruin. What the banks do in the circumstances is to combine and sink their individual risks in a common danger against which they can put forth their common efforts. The analogy holds for a continent on the verge of ruin, for a system of politics and economics in danger of going down in the common disaster. We are endeavoring to constitute a League of Nations. The League can be no more firm than the nations that compose it; and those nations will disintegrate or become consolidated according as we succeed or fail in a prompt resumption of work.

We shall fail or succeed according as we recognize that the problem is not nationalistic but continental; that a truce must be proclaimed to petty nationalistic jealousies and cupidities; that combined international finance for rehabilitation and reconstruction is a matter of common necessity. In other times a purely political League of Nations might have sufficed to guarantee the several states a fair chance of gradual and orderly progress. But the present is a time of crisis, when it would behoove the statesman to look beyond political organization to the economic conditions that make up the foundations upon which any enduring League must ultimately rest.

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EDITORS

HERBERT CROLY — FRANCIS HACKETT
PHILIP LITTELL — ALVIN JOHNSON
WALTER E. WEYL — WALTER LIPPMANN
SIGNE TOKSVIG, Assistant Editor

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Article Ten of the League

To the Editor of The New Republic,

SIR: I reproach you with not being as helpful as you might be to the United States Senate. You are cogent with the Senate. You demonstrate, philosophically and perfectly, the necessity of a League of Nations. But a United States Senator cannot vote for a necessity. He cannot vote for an idea. He has to vote for a certain definite form of words, in this case setting up certain definite international institutions and international rules of conduct. I call your attention to the first sentence of Article Ten. You have already commented on it unfavorably. But I ask you to face action. I ask you: Would you, as a liberal, if you were a United States Senator, vote for the League of Nations with the first sentence of Article Ten in it?

I ask you to notice, in association with the first sentence of Article Ten, a certain strange and significant happening on the floor of the Senate. The most thoroughly argued defense of the League of Nations on the floor of the Senate was made by a Republican Senator—Mr. McCumber of North Dakota. Mr. McCumber is a man whom a political Izaak Walton might write a book about entitled properly The Compleat Tory. I do not state Mr. McCumber's Toryism in order to disparage him. I keep in mind the wisdom once confided to me by a justice of the Supreme Court of the United States who urged me to remember that on the Judgment Day, in the eternal retrospect, the Tories may turn out to have been right and those of us who rejoice in being progressives and liberals and what-not may turn out to have been wrong. I state Mr. McCumber's Toryism only in order to place him.

I have heard Mr. McCumber, on the floor of the Senate, advocate, as the prime recipe for the restoration of prosperity in the United States, the immediate reduction of wages for common labor. I have heard him, on the floor of the Senate, advocate the retention and the enlargement of Allied and American forces in Russia for the purpose of waging war against the Soviet Republic until "law and order" are restored in Russia even if, in pursuance of the establishment of law and order, it should become necessary to restore the autocracy. He is one of the Senate's most vehement supporters of intervention in Russia; and it is in connection with intervention in Russia that I ask you to notice his speech in favor of the League of Nations.

That speech began with the League of Nations. It ended with Russia. Two-thirds of it was in favor of establishing a League of Nations, with great commendation of the first sentence of Article Ten. The last third of it was in favor of continued and increased Allied and American warfare against the government at Moscow. And the final sentence was:

"I felt that it ought to go out to the American people that some of us on this side of the Chamber are in favor of continuing our war in Russia until we have enabled the people of that country to establish a government, and I felt also that it ought to be known that there are some Republicans who are strongly in favor of this great country joining hands with the other great nations of the world to protect the innocent people of the world from another such cataclysm."

Sir, the first sentence of Article Ten might well justify Mr. McCumber in hoping that one of the first acts of the League of Nations will be to conduct a holy war against the Russian Soviet Republic. It might well justify him in hoping that the great ultimate result of the League of Nations will be to strengthen established society everywhere against fundamental change, bad or good, anywhere. I remind you that it reads:

"The high contracting parties undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and the political independence of all states members of the League."

I hasten to assure you that I do not approach this subject from the standpoint of certain Senators who object to American participation in European affairs. In view of recent events, with their cost to us, I see no reason whatever why a dispute between Serbia and Austria should be surrendered to an attempted settlement by Europe alone. Similarly, and concessively, I see no reason whatsoever why a dispute between Haiti and the United States, or a dispute between Haiti and France, should be settled by the United States alone.

In 1914 Mr. Wilson rejected cooperation by France in Haiti and proceeded to settle all French and American difficulties in Haiti by United States marines and United States machine-guns. The Monroe Doctrine, from being a policy of self-protection, has become a policy of empire. Mr. Olney truly expressed its modern form when he said: "To-day the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition."

I do not see how we can grow toward any genuine and fruitful comradeship with other nations as long as we assume to cut the world in

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two and to be the sole rulers of all the sovereign nations in half of it. I claim American consultation in European affairs and I concede European consultation in American affairs; but I incidentally ask you if it is not true (barring the first sentence of Article Ten and barring certain very unlikely cases under Article Twelve and Article Fifteen) that the extreme limit of European interference in American affairs will be simply consultation and conference? I ask you if it is not true that the compulsion which the League of Nations is supposed to exercise upon its members is largely, from one standpoint, a gross misunderstanding and, from another standpoint, a gross sham?

I venture to ask you these questions because you are in general a warm adherent of Mr. Wilson's and because there is just one big sure way in which the sham in question can be shattered and the misunderstanding in question can be dissipated—namely, by frankness and openness on Mr. Wilson's part. I reproach you with perceiving the responsibility and the irresponsibility of the Senate much more clearly and emphatically and copiously than you perceive the responsibility and the irresponsibility of Mr. Wilson.

Mr. Wilson for two years used language leading the country to believe that the League of Nations would be a concert of peoples and powers for pouncing on every prospect of war and shaking it to sure death. He fostered the expectation that he would come back from Europe with a document generally and amply "preventing war." In that expectation, when he came back, the public and the Senate perused his document; and, in the mood of that expectation, they quite misread it. What then was the proper cure for their misreading? It was, it is, that Mr. Wilson himself, the leader of the project of the League of Nations, and the only responsible American author of it, should arise and orate candidly somewhat as follows:

"Outside of Article Ten, this document proposes to apply concerted compulsion to the United States (or to any other member of the League) in only two cases; and those two cases are extremely unlikely and, in fact, almost inconceivable. The idea that I have organized a League of Nations with teeth in it to bite the life out of any nation starting any war is a popular superstition which I indeed helped to create but which I now step forward to absolutely repudiate. I ask you to observe Article Twelve and Article Fifteen. They are the core of the document.

"Under Article Twelve, when we have sent a dispute to a Board of Arbitrators or to the League of Nations, we agree not to go to war against our antagonist in case our antagonist accepts the award of the Board of Arbitrators or the 'recommendation' of the League of Nations. In other words, we agree that the award or the 'recommendation' shall be final. Does this agreement seem drastic? I ask you to observe farther.

"If we send a dispute to arbitration, we send it there of our own free will. The document says so. We send a dispute to arbitration only if it seems to us to be 'suitable' for arbitration. Very well. Having freely sent a dispute to arbitration, would we ever reject the result of that arbitration? Having invoked an award, would we refuse to abide by the award? It would be flat fraud. It would be a violation of the most elementary national honor. It is altogether inconceivable. And that is the first case. It will never happen. We shall never expose ourselves to coercion by the League of Nations through rejecting an arbitration award.

"The second case comes out of a 'recommendation' by the League of Nations. If our dispute is not settled by diplomacy, and if it is not settled by arbitration, it goes to the League of Nations. It may go to the Executive Council of the League of Nations or it may go to the Board of Delegates of the League of Nations, as we please. If we fear the compactness of the Executive Council, we are at perfect liberty to take a change of venue to the Board of Delegates. Now read Article Fifteen attentively. Read it as attentively as my friend Mr. Taft has read it. You will see, as he sees, that no 'recommendation' by the Executive Council or by the Board of Delegates is a 'recommendation' at all unless it is unanimous.

"Fellow-citizens, if the Board of Delegates, consisting of representatives of every nation in the world, should ever arrive at a unanimous decision, I claim that its utterance would indeed come close to being the voice of humanity and the voice of God in the world. I claim, and admit, that in such a case the United States would be obliged, by its given word, under this document, to bend its national will into compliance with the world's will. But I appeal to your common sense. How often do you think that such a case will arise? How often (unless our side of the dispute is patently and flagrantly and inexcusably wrong) will every nation in the world without exception give its confidence and its support to our antagonist? My judgment, and your judgment, is 'Never.'

"The truth is, ladies and gentlemen, that this document of mine is essentially and almost exclusively an effort to extend and to improve the world's facilities for international conference and consultation. When the conferring is over, when the consulting is over, unless a unanimous decision has been reached, the nations of the world will proceed onward toward war or toward peace in the light of their consciences but also—and here is the gain,

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here is the great and inexpressibly valuable gain—also in the light of the exchanges of views among all the peoples of the world, also in the light of the ascertained judgments of world-majorities. Nations will act hereafter only after world-wide interrogation by their fellow-nations. The moral check, the practical pause, thus given to war is glory enough for any statesman. I am content with it. I go no farther. And I tell you frankly that in practice, outside of Article Ten, and outside of the two cases I have discussed under Article Twelve and Article Fifteen, the document goes no farther. To stretch it farther you have to read my speeches. I tell you frankly that the right way to understand the League is to read the document and then not my speeches, but Mr. Taft's. However, since an expression of opinion by the League's chief organizer with regard to the League's chief purpose in practice seems to be desired, I have given it."

One such frank statement by Mr. Wilson would do more to put our feet on the path of truth than can be done by any amount of debate in the Senate or by any amount of attack upon the Senate. You have struck the Senate boldly on its august face. I wish you would call Mr. Wilson's attention to his duty by more than an occasional timid pull at the sacred hem of his presidential raiment. He could make Article Twelve and Article Fifteen instantly and admittedly clear; and, in doing so, he would simultaneously reveal the utterly indefensible character of the first sentence of Article Ten.

The first sentence of Article Ten is a denial of conference. It is a denial of consultation. It lays down a rule of conduct prior to conference and prior to consultation. It binds every nation of the world beforehand to a certain fixed view of a certain class of events. It does not mention the League of Nations. It lays an individual obligation to maintain the world's present boundaries upon every individual nation in the world. The United States, as the United States, as an individual nation, irrespective of conference or consultation with other nations, must "preserve" the territorial integrity of Italy and of Poland "against external aggression," no matter what the cause or what the character of that "external aggression" may be. If no other nation in the world responds to the obligation, the United States still must. Its individual word is given and its individual honor is engaged.

To be sure, the second sentence of the article goes on to say that "in case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression, the Executive Council shall advise upon the means by which the obligation shall be fulfilled." But the advice of the Executive Council is only supplementary to the obligation itself. The obligation is complete. The United States, by itself if necessary, must defend the territorial integrity of Italy against the Jugo-Slavs.

You doubtless do not assume, to be sure, that Italy will not get the Dalmatian coast in the final peace treaty of 1919. You know, and you have said in your columns, that the Italian claim to the Dalmatian coast is anti-national and anti-democratic. Nevertheless, in the present exigencies of international politics, you can not be sure that the Dalmatian coast will not pass into Italian hands. Then what? Then, knowing the Jugo-Slavs, I perfectly know that they will some day make an overt effort to drive the Italian invader from their soil and to take possession of it for themselves.

First, through their newly organized state of Jugo-Slavia, they will appeal to the Executive Council of the League of Nations. I assume that they will be permitted to appeal to it. Italy will shift the hearing of the cause from the Executive Council to the Board of Delegates. In the Board of Delegates certain nations bitterly anti-Jugo-Slav—Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, Greece—will vote. There will be no "recommendation." There will be no unanimous decision. There could not be. The dispute will go back to Italy and Jugo-Slavia, with observations in favor of coolness and compromise. But there are some questions which do not lend themselves to coolness and compromise. This is one of them. Jugo-Slavia declares war on Italy. Who can deny that it might?

In such a war, if I had to fight, I would prefer to fight on the side of Jugo-Slavia. So would every other democratic American. It would be the side of the self-determination of peoples, of national right. But, under the present draft of the League of Nations, I would have to fight on the side of Italy; because the war by Jugo-Slavia against Italy would be clearly a war of "external aggression."

Sir, I make bold to lay down, for your criticism, a certain general tentative suggestion about the probabilities of the future. Hereafter, in Europe, with the Romanoffs gone, with the Hohenzollerns gone, with the Hapsburgs gone, the side of democracy is the side of stir and the side of anti-democracy is the side of status. I dare say you fully agree. I dare say you regard my statement as a platitude. Would you then vote, if you were a Senator, for a rule of international conduct binding us beforehand to constant intervention on the anti-democratic side?

The words "external aggression" will not in practice save us from interventions and entanglements in internal domestic change. Internal domestic change and "external aggression" are continuous companions. The democratic self-government of this country, notoriously, was achieved only

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through "external aggression" by France against Britain. We may live to see many similar events in Europe.

Imagine a reactionary government in Poland, under Paderewski. It is easily imagined. Imagine a radically democratic government in Russia, not the government of Lenine and Trotsky, but a government, we will say, of moderate Mensheviks, insofar as any Social Democrats can be moderate. Imagine, then, a revolt in Poland, of the poorer peasants, of workingmen, led by Pilsudski. This revolt is vibrating between failure and success. In come Socialist soldiers from Russia, sent by the Russian government, to help their Polish fellow-Socialists. It would be more than natural. It would be inevitable. But it would be, also, undeniably, a war of "external aggression" by Russia against Poland; and the United States would be bound to set itself in motion to "preserve" Poland against this externally aggressive Russian act; and we should see American soldiers fighting for Polish land holders against Russian land dividers.

Such considerations weigh heavily on the minds of many Senators. You say, and say truly, that much of the opposition to the League of Nations in the Senate is politics. You might say, with equal truth, that much of the support of the League of Nations in the Senate is politics. I doubt if there are five Democratic Senators, who, without politics, would vote for the draft of the League of Nations in its present form. They would make many serious revisions. So would you, as shown by your last week's editorial, mildly but completely exposing the error of those Presidential partisans who would agitate for the League without criticism of the League's "covenant." But the President tells us that he will try to come back from Europe with the "covenant" of the League so interwoven into the terms of the peace treaty that "you cannot dissect the covenant from the treaty without destroying the whole vital structure."

Surely you cannot approve of such politics. I admit that a League is essential to a Peace. But surely you cannot approve of a programme which is manifestly intended to compel the United States Senate to accept the whole "covenant" without any cure whatsoever of its many manifest mistakes. Among those mistakes I present you with the first sentence of Article Ten, and I ask for your judgment on it as follows:

I submit that the first sentence of Article Ten is a surrender to the Tories. I submit that it bind the United States to use all its resources of men and money to "preserve" forever every territorial iniquity which the present peace conference may establish. I agree that the United States ought to confer and consult with the nations of Europe on every war and on every prospect of war in Europe. But I submit that we should be free to form our judgment on the merits of each case as it comes and to act accordingly. I submit that if the rule of Article Ten had been adopted in the days of Marcus Aurelius we should still have a Roman Empire from the Euphrates to the Tweed. I submit that the world has not yet arrived at the end of its possible growth. I submit that the first sentence of Article Ten is a sentence of death on much of the possible liberal growth of the future. I submit that it is really the one rule of conduct, as distinguished from rules of structure and rules of procedure, in the whole draft. I submit that its adoption will give the framework, the husk, of the League to you and the kernel to Mr. McCumber. If I am wrong, I await your rod of correction. If I am right I ask you:

Will you, as vehemently as in your urgings to the Senate, urge the President to return from Europe with the "covenant" of the League of Nations so written that the first sentence of Article Ten can be eliminated from it?

Will you urge the Senate to eliminate that sentence, no matter what the President may do or say?

WILLIAM HARD.

How the Wettest State Went Dry

WHEN Nevada and Wyoming went dry in November, the West went dry; that is the Fairbanks-Hart West, the frontier West that ends with the Sierras and in which Reno is the last stop. California, manicured and metropolitan, remained wet, but that is a different story. The old West went dry.

And when the West went dry it went out; not because the passing of the saloon caused the end, but because it emphasized that West. The saloon played such a part in the old frontier life that its passing was like the death of the oldest inhabitant whose obsequies closed forever the door between the new and the old West—the old West that was a gamble, a dare, a fortune over night, a miracle in the desert, a treasure in the mountain, a ghost, a restless, transient, sensational West that made good material for movies but a poor commonwealth.

The spectacular feature of the going dry of the West is its former wetness. The very beginnings of that country centred about the saloon, just as in New England the population grouped itself about the tall-spired, Congregational church. Nor did it gradually grow dry through local option. Until it went dry it was wet, with no degree of dampness.

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And of all the wet West, and of all the wet East there was probably no state more out-and-out, above-board, all-over wet than was Nevada, and no state went dry more deliberately. Not for fear of being forced in by the federal amendment did they "Voter dry"—they are not that kind of people, but through a referendum in true western style, and in the white sunlight of a November day, many of them with the beer still wet upon their lips, did they register their individual conviction that the saloon, their oldest and most prolific institution, must go.

Never a camp sprang into existence in the state that was not frontiered by the saloon, and it was so all over the old West. One day someone would strike it rich, and the next day there would go up in the sage-brush or on the bare mountain-side a great blatant sign SALOON fastened to a square box of a building, and then the people would come pouring in across the desert or toiling up the mountain-side with the saloon as a beacon, something to fasten to and a place to begin. Immediately up went the shacks and tent-houses, radiating from the saloon and striking into a street. Then beds were twenty dollars a night, and there was a new boom city on the map—in the desert or on the mountain, with an assay office, a water system, a stage line, a post office, a red light, a bank, a sheriff and a hotel all grouped about the saloon, but never dominating it.

Then as the camp grew the saloon became a café and a thing of elegance and beauty. Travellers to this day marvel at the elegance of the café, Sawdust Corner, in Virginia City, where crystal, carved wood, silver trappings and oil paintings symbolize the wealth of the old Comstock days, centred as they were by the saloon.

The names, too, were in keeping with the elegance of the cafés—the Elite, the Empire, the Lotus, the Waldorf, the Buckingham, the Mecca and the Mizpah were names to be lived up to. They resided in the most conspicuous parts of the business section and never went skulking around the corner with the name of Murphy's Joint and a smell of stale beer, as in the East. Atlantic City in the West would have displayed its saloons upon the Board Walk.

Even during the past summer when every one knew that Nevada was going dry, the saloons lost none of their verve. Up until twelve o'clock on the night of the sixteenth of December, when the ban was to fall, they remained the prosperous centre of things, with no hint of defeat in the raggish symphony of their jazz bands. There was a hint of the unusual, but never one of decadence, about the wet centres in the weeks preceding the sixteenth, when, like sales of bizarre millinery, bargains in strange drinks were displayed in the windows. Unsalable bottles that had not seen the light for years, unorthodox things like Pausee Cafi, Kümmel, Chartreuse, Ambrosia and Noyeau begged to be sold, some for even a dollar a bottle. People who had never been known to drink, led on by the instinct of either bargain buying or hoarding, laid in a supply of drinks. Empty demijohns and kegs for storage purposes were at a premium.

The spirit of the West is one of sharp cleavages, black or white, wet or dry, with no haggling over half tones. In the restaurants when one asks for tea, the challenge will come back—"Black or green?" This was the spirit manifest in the going dry of Reno and typical of every western city's change to dryness. Up until twelve o'clock on the night of the sixteenth, the city was wet, nor all the expletives in the English language can describe her wetness.

The very men who "voted her dry," and who will insist upon her dryness, were as wet as booze could make them, upon the night that was to mark the end of Barleycorn. Men who had never staggered before, staggered that night. Those who were not drunk were said to be and it amounted to much the same thing. One man, a "pillar" he was, had gone out to watch the obsequies and lost his hat which he had hung upon the hat rack at one of the best cafés. Perfectly sober, he might as well have been drunk, for going home hatless through the crowded Main Street ruined him forever as a "pillar."

Everywhere it was a wild night, with all degrees of wildness and each to his own taste, from the drinking of polite cocktails and champagne indulged in by the divorce colony at the Riverside to the ribald performances at places less smart. The Eminently-Respectables went out to be shocked, and were. There were scenes that would have done credit to New York or Nome. Drinking women kissed strange men and lights went off and on to scenes of the wildest abandon.

Through all the madness, there was a note of sadness almost solemn. At the Colombo a hundred men sang an Italian funeral anthem. One of the largest places displayed this sign: "To thank our friends for their kindly patronage of the past and to extend to them cordial greetings for the season that is to come. Mizpah." Travelling minstrels went from place to place, playing upon accordions and singing the Marseillaise. At Kane's, when the clock struck twelve, there was a dramatic moment when everyone touched glasses and sang, "How dry I am, how dry I am, God only knows how dry I am." One could almost distinguish the Salvation Army version, "Oh, happy day, oh, happy day when Jesus washed my sins away." That was at

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twelve. In five minutes everyone had ordered tea, "black or green." And that was the way that Reno went dry and the way that every western city has gone dry.

The next day the saloon was a closed incident, with neither whimpering nor reminiscence to mark its departure. That was western, but the going dry of individual men was as universal as toothache is. In every group, north or south or west, when states have gone dry have men discussed their individual water-wagon experiences with an enthusiasm only equalled in the discussion of "Flu" symptoms. There is the man who never drank when the state was wet, who has developed the most insistent thirst since the state went dry; then there is the braggart who can get all he wants at any time, he "knows a place"; but the most common type is he who tells you how he gets along perfectly well, has no desire for it and used to indulge in his daily. The typical westerner bows to events.

When the nation is dry it will be said that the West went dry more spontaneously than any section of the country. The decision was made through a deliberate referendum and not through state legislation or ratification of the federal amendment. It was the people who "Voted her dry" and of the people it was the hard drinker, known in the West as the "booze-fighter," who was the deciding factor in every referendum. What his contemporary in other parts of the country would have done no one knows, for he never had a chance to register his opinion.

The "booze-fighter" voted out the saloon for two reasons, the first of which was to avenge himself upon the saloon keeper who was a profiteer of unusually dirty methods. The story of Jim Carroll illustrates one of his favorite and more flagrant methods of procedure.

Jim Carroll belonged to the great western army of homeless men, of which Nevada has the greatest preponderance. He had been away out in the hills at some remote mining camp for months and had saved his money because he could not spend it in the sage. One day, tired of the loneliness, he went out to the nearest centre to find a recreational antidote for his months of work and there, very naturally went to the saloon, it being the only social centre in the place. He was not a bad man and had no intention of getting drunk, but he took a drink to be sociable and another, and then the saloon man, master of the art of tempting, with his workers, summoned Jim to comradeship, as Mr. Wilson would say, so that he kept on drinking until the next afternoon, when he awoke to find the savings of months gone and nothing left but a confused memory of the night before, of warmth, music, light, love, a woman's red lips and the beginnings of an ineffable stupor. That memory was like a blow in the face.

Indignant and still drunk, Jim Carroll sought redress. "You spent it down the line," said the saloon man; "You spent it in the saloon," said the scarlet woman; "Why did you get so drunk?" scolded the sheriff. So it was that Jim Carroll lost his money, but not his memory. And after a time he met others—"done dirty" by the same host and they compared notes and bided their time. On the fifth of November it came, their chance for revenge and they took it.

The "booze-fighter" had another reason for voting dry. To vote out the saloon was his supreme opportunity for doing away with the temptation to his greatest vice. Here again he was avenged, for had not drink deprived him of a man's part in life? If all men had the opportunity to vote out the temptation to their greatest vices what a rushing to the polls there would be upon election day.

With the passing of John Barleycorn the "booze-fighter" begins to pass. He was often more sinned against than sinning and his weakness gave him a humility that made him sometimes more likable than the man who tried to reform him. It was probably the only virtue that Barleycorn had that he made men humble and brought them to their knees before God. If hypocrisy, like the sin of drinking, should cause a staggering of the legs, or some other outward and visible sign of an inward and spiritual disgrace, the Pharisee would pass with the "booze-fighter."

We offer no brief for the saloon any more than we would for the highwayman, the gambler or the "man before breakfast" habit, but in passing we beg to call attention to a certain picturesqueness that it possessed. While the Pot Roast Café will be undoubtedly better for the welfare of man than was the U and I Bar, the latter did have a more picturesque and convivial sound. "U and I"—ah, me! "U and I" and a "loaf of bread and thou beside me." By and by the Idle-while Tea House will replace the Bucket-o-Blood Bar, but it will never produce the wicked thrill that the latter gave to us.

The "thrill" and the "life" of the saloon were not life in its real sense, though, and this is why the West went dry. A serious, forward-gazing people, they are ready to build for permanency, for a generation of home-lovers who will succeed the prospectors, for an era of earned incomes to succeed the days of easy-come, easy-go prosperity; and the saloon that went out when Nevada and Wyoming went dry was the last door to be closed upon the old, transient, restless West.

KATE MULLEN.

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Hero-Worship and the British Navy

HERO-WORSHIP is a most amiable weakness but it is also a national danger. It is all the more dangerous when it extends beyond individuals to institutions, especially institutions on which the safety of the state depends. It saves the expense of thought and abolishes criticism, on which all public institutions depend for their efficiency. Many people would qualify the statement and say "almost all institutions." In a democracy it is impossible to admit the limitation. The less criticism of an intelligent, instructive kind, the less the efficiency we shall secure. Admit an exception, and hero-worship, applied to an institution, will result in lack of enterprise and foresight. Public opinion is the greatest stimulus that a democracy can apply to any of its services. If it be not applied, democracy must blame not only its officials but itself also for the disappointment, perhaps disaster, which will surely overtake it.

This is one of the lessons, if only one, which results from Lord Jellicoe's revelations about the state of the British fleet from the beginning of the war to 1916. To the British public the navy has always been something quasi-sacred. The bare suggestion that it was not in every respect a perfect machine of war, equal if not superior to the navy of any other Power from every point of view, was little short of treason. There were indeed fierce political controversies about the navy in the years before the war, but they were almost entirely concerned with one or two special points, such as the size of the building programme, which was considered in terms of Dreadnoughts only, and even these controversies were often rather questions of financial expenditure or of international relations than of the strength and internal efficiency of our fighting force. It is true that the advisability of the Dreadnought type and of the battle cruiser was discussed, the development of the big gun was debated, Lord Beresford made his plea for a more generous supply of lighter craft, and now and then fascinating speculations were published about the effects which submarine war would have in the North Sea and the extent to which the Germans, as the weaker Power, would make use of floating mines. But there was no public disquietude about these or any other questions. One does not, said Aristotle, deliberate about the impossible. Englishmen did not debate whether on the technical side of the navy we should be ready for war with Germany, whether our equipment was as good as that of any other navy in the world, whether we had taken elementary precautions against the surprise attack which it was common knowledge that we feared. Anything else was inconceivable, so why discuss it? And in fact, we did not discuss it.

During the war itself we received some strange and disappointing hints. It was reported that the early British mines were defective. Mr. Balfour blurted out in Parliament that at the beginning of the war there was no single base on the east coast which was equipped with defences against submarines. It became known that at the time when the "Audacious" was sunk off the north coast of Ireland the Grand Fleet had been driven from its base at Scapa Flow to more westerly waters in order to evade attack by submarine. Even the major operations of the war raised curious questions. It was obvious that in the night of May 31-June 1, 1916, Lord Jellicoe had not sought to force an action with the German fleet, which had broken off the fight during the previous evening. He might or might not have been right in his judgment, but clearly there was a great deal still to be said about the state of the navy from the first day of the war. Lord Jellicoe has now said it and a very remarkable utterance it is.

There were no defences against submarines at any of the east coast bases in August, 1914. There were no coast guns to speak of at Scapa Flow and guns had to be landed from the fleet. There were no nets or booms and all defences had to be improvised. The fleet could not stop long in any one base lest it should be attacked. It had therefore to spend most of its time at sea. When it changed its base, defences had again to be improvised in its new haven—one could not honestly say shelter. Sometimes it went to the west coast of Scotland, sometimes to the north of Ireland. When a German submarine was reported to have been sighted in the waters of Scapa, there was a general hurry and scurry, the small craft steaming up and down at top speed to distract its aim, others going alongside the big ships to protect them, while the fleet proper got up steam with all speed and made to sea even in weather which exposed it to great danger in getting out through the treacherous cross-tides of the Scapa region. But the bases lacked even the usual appurtenances of naval stations. The bases had been shifted from the south coast to the east, but the equipment remained in the south. At Scapa there were no storages for coal nor for reserve ammunition; everything had to be carried in ships. Lord Jellicoe had to ask for wireless installations to be set up in the Orkneys.

But such deficiencies, it may be said, applied only

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to the early months of the war. By no means. Some of them certainly were remedied, but others were not. Lord Jellicoe now explains why he avoided a night action at the Battle of Jutland. The Germans, it seems, had star-shells and the use of these was "at the time unfamiliar to us"; their searchlights were very powerful—"much more so than ours"; they had an excellent method of working searchlights and guns together; and they had some system of "director-firing" fitted to their secondary armament which we had not. In the Battle of Jutland also we discovered that the German shells had a much greater penetrating power against armor than our own. While our shells burst on the armor of a ship, the German shells went through it and burst in the vitals of the vessel. Hitherto, it had been alleged in excuse for the sinking of the battle-cruisers by single German salvoes during the battle that this was a pure stroke of luck which would probably never be repeated in a hundred years. But from Lord Jellicoe it appears that this was no strange coincidence but the direct result of the Germans possessing a shell much superior to our own. We improved our own shells greatly —after the battle. Finally, we were at the beginning of the war short of destroyers, and the defense offered is that the Admiralty could never secure the money necessary for their needs and, being compelled to reduce their programme in one direction or another, reduced it on the side of the small craft.

No one explanation is sufficient to account for so many and such grave deficiencies. We can distinguish several. There was during the years before the war intense activity in the study and development of the capital ship and the big gun. The leading minds of the navy, partly influenced by the lessons of the Battle of the Sea of Japan in 1905, had come to the conclusion that in any naval battle the side which could bring superior gun-fire to bear would not only defeat, but would very rapidly annihilate the enemy. They worked steadily in the direction of bigger guns and bigger ships as a platform for the guns. They had come to the conclusion also that the country which had the preponderance in these two factors would be able to obtain and hold control of the sea and that the paramount need of England was the possession—to put the point at its briefest—of a superior fleet of Dreadnoughts. Both their conclusions, up to a point, were right. The war showed that the power of the big gun to annihilate an inferior was even more unqualified than anyone had supposed. It was shown at the battle of Coronel, when the "Monmouth" and "Good Hope" went down; it was shown again when Lord Fisher despatched the two battle cruisers which sank the "Gneisenau" and "Scharnhorst" at the Battle of the Falkland Isles; it was shown in the sinking of the "Blücher" at the Battle of the Dogger Bank. It was the existence of a superior number of capital ships which gave England the control of the surface of the seas. The Germans were indeed so much impressed with British strength in this respect that they never attempted to challenge it, for whatever else may be said about the Battle of Jutland the Germans had certainly no intention, when they left port, of seeking an issue with the main British fleet.

Whether the British battleships and guns would have exercised their unquestioned supremacy had the Germans not shared the British naval conviction about the invincibility of Dreadnoughts is another story altogether. Or rather, it is precisely part of this story. For the fact is that this obsession of ours with Dreadnoughts went a long way to defeat itself. It led to an astonishing neglect of other sides of warfare which—we have Lord Jellicoe's own word for it—might have involved us in disaster had the Germans been more wideawake, enterprising, and better informed about the condition we were in. There were clearly weaknesses of staff work. The probable development of submarines and mines by Germany had not been worked out. It is idle to say that no one had foreseen the submarine danger. It was not the business of laymen to think out a problem of this kind, though there was keen discussion of it, but it was the business of the Admiralty, and so far from its being true that they could not anticipate the danger, no sooner was Lord Jellicoe in command of the fleet on the first day of the war than he realized the perils which immediately confronted him. There was no reason why he should not have realized long before the position in which the British fleet would be placed if on the outbreak of war with Germany it was found at unprotected bases. The conclusion is inevitable—that the staff was inadequately organized for its work. The main problem of offense had been industriously studied, but defense, the problems of the attack which we might expect from a power which could not challenge us in capital ships, had been neglected. In the same way, when the Admiralty decided to transfer the fleet to bases on the east coast, there was apparently no section of the staff whose business it was to see that the proper equipment of naval bases should accompany the transfer. The deficiency was twofold. The first was in the thinking department, the second in administration. Both of them sprang from an organization which was defective for the purposes of war. In fact, we only organized a staff to meet the conditions of war under the pressure of war conditions as we went along.

The superiority of the Germans in various departments of matériel reveals another weakness.

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In the days before the war it was the fear of the layman that the Germans, with their high technique and skill in applied science, would be able in an uncomfortable degree to neutralize the superior craft, the traditional feeling for the sea, of the British. We remembered how the landsmen of Rome had defeated the Carthaginian seamen with superior mechanical appliances. But we harbored such fears only to dismiss them and assumed at least an equality of technical skill. Lord Jellicoe's revelations about star shells, searchlights, mines, fire control and shells proves that the assumption was unjustified. He himself was enormously impressed by the efficiency of the German matériel and his apprehensions influenced powerfully his choice of tactics. How to explain it? The root of the trouble is that the British navy, like the army, draws its officers of all sorts from too narrow a stratum of the nation. Neither service represents, or ever has represented, the highest intelligence that the nation can provide, and this is true not least of intelligence on the scientific side.

When the brains of the whole nation are the reservoir from which to equip the national services we have nothing to fear, or, if we have, we must bear the penalty, for a nation gets the army or the navy, like the government, that its brains deserve. In the equipment of the army we were inferior to the Germans when the war broke out, but at the finish we had overpassed them. We contrived, for instance, to produce the tank. During the last months of the war both the British and American aeroplanes, but not the German, were equipped with wireless telephones. In aerial photography we had perfected labor-saving devices of great value which the Germans never possessed. But in the days of peace both Admiralty and War office drew on a comparatively small and narrow caste, which provided men of fine character and often of great ability, but certainly did not represent adequately the best intelligence of the country and therefore could not obtain its best fruits. Whatever army and navy we retain, one of our first (and most formidable) tasks will be to broaden the basis on which they are officered and to secure that both services can draw on the best resources that the nation can supply both in abstract thinking and in applied science. And that means great changes of outlook and of system, a democratization of the service and better conditions of life and pay for those who join it.

But at bottom we come back to the vice of hero-worship. A nation gets the navy it deserves. If public opinion had applied to the organization and equipment of the navy the incessant vigilance and criticism which are applied in commerce, in domestic party politics, and even in sport, we should neither have been unprepared for the elementary contingencies of naval warfare nor been found lacking in fundamental matters of equipment. Partly the trouble lies with Parliament, which has long been declining as an efficient organ of instructed criticism; partly with the public itself, which has taken too modest a view of its own capacity for helping the national interests where the navy is concerned. We have heard much and constantly about the duty of the layman to keep silent and allow the military and naval experts to manage their own affairs, as though the affairs which they managed were really theirs and not those of the whole nation. We have had not too much, but too little of the layman. Will the layman now at last assert himself, both in Parliament and without, and shall we obtain the cleansing and inspiring criticism which is necessary for military and naval, as for civilian, health? If not, we are in a bad way, for like causes will produce like effects.

W. P. Crozier.

A Whitman Centenary

THE four days in February that did triple duty by celebrating the centenary of James Russell Lowell, the birthday of George Washington and what seemed to be an Anglo-American alliance, were not without a significant humor. Held ostensibly to honor the author of The Vision of Sir Launfal, there were not half a dozen American poets of note at any of the various dinners, theatre-parties and public love-feasts. Among all the tributes showered upon Lowell the diplomat, Lowell the bookman and Lowell the foe of slavery, there was no word for Lowell the recorder of homely folk or Lowell the seditious "pacifist." Scraps of his academic odes were read with unction, placid stanzas on Agassiz and Longfellow were printed with polite approbation; but scarcely anyone spoke of the first three Biglow Papers, and no one dared to quote such stanzas of flat conscientious objection as:

> Ez for war, I call it murder—
> There you hev it plain an' flat;
> I don't want to go no furder
> Than my Testyment for that. . .
> Ef you take a sword an' dror it,
> An' go stick a feller thru,
> Guv'ment ain't no answer for it,
> God'll send the bill to you.

But what was possibly the most curiously ironic feature of the celebration was the unanimity of the press in echoing the New York Times' estimate that "a more determined, a more thorough American than Lowell it would be hard to find." No one evi-

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dently thought of searching—or they would have found that another poet, the most truly indigenous writer we have ever produced, was born just a hundred years ago at West Hills, Long Island. Nor would the joint festivities have been any the less appropriate for, strangely enough, it was England that first discovered the authentic Americanism of Walt Whitman.

It will be interesting to observe how many of our universities and academies of arts and letters appreciate Whitman's liberating influence even to-day; May thirty-first (Whitman's birthday) will be a fresh test for those who dwelt with such emphasis on the fact that Lowell used the English language. I venture to predict that there will be no four-day chorus of lauds and magnificats. It is one thing to glorify a man who has worked industriously in the bonds of an old rhetoric and a routine romanticism; it is another thing to praise the man who struck off the bonds. And it is as a liberator, even more than as a poet, that Whitman has influenced American art. Whether we regard him as pioneer or (as Van Wyck Brooks has it) the great precipitant, there is scarcely any strong tendency in native letters that Whitman has not somehow strengthened, clarified, impelled, democratized.

He came with a double-barreled challenge to a literary aristocracy. His was, first of all, a democracy of thought, of emotion, of theme. When the New Englanders (whose colonial poetry was not nearly as representative of New England as of old England) were going to village blacksmiths and chambered nautili for embroidered mottoes and neatly-turned maxims, he was taking his material hot from the raucous tumble of life. While most of his transatlantic contemporaries were strolling elegantly through Bullfinch's Mythology, hymning the minor amours of the major Greek divinities, Whitman was writing:

> "Come, Muse, migrate from Greece and Ionia.
> Cross out, please, those immensely overpaid accounts;
> That matter of Troy and Achilles' wrath, and Æneas',
> Odysseus' wanderings.
> Placard 'Removed' and 'To Let' on the rocks of your snowy Parnassus . . .
> For know a better, fresher, busier sphere; a wider, untried domain awaits and demands you."

It was Whitman who first revealed "the glory of the commonplace"; for him ugliness was fused perfectly in a vast harmonic counterpoint. Nothing remained casual. He showed the ordinary in a blaze of color that shamed the attempted brilliance of the PreRaphaelites; his daily street-corners, ferries, bridges, were more bewildering than the lunar landscapes of Poe. His barbaric yawp could be softened to express a lyric ecstasy over a blade of grass which to him was "no less than the journey-work of the stars"; his naïf wonder dwelt on the miracle of a mouse that would "stagger sextillions of infidels" and his own hairy hand, whose "narrowest hinge puts to scorn all machinery." It is this large naturalism, this affection for all that is homely and of the soil that set him apart from his fellow-craftsmen as our first American poet.

> And the cow, crunching with depressed head, surpasses any statue . . .
> And the running blackberry would adorn the parlors of heaven.

Scarcely less important than his anti-patrician thought, was his democratic speech. It was Whitman's use of the rich verbal matter that he found in the street rather than in libraries that made his influence so dominating. And, again in distinction to his scholarly compatriots, it was an American speech he was using. He even went so far as to declare that he often thought the whole of Leaves of Grass was only a language experiment, an effort toward a democratic (as opposed to a merely genteel) tongue. "It is," he said, "an attempt to give the spirit, the body, the man, new words, new potentialities of speech—an American, a cosmopolitan (the best of America is the best cosmopolitanism) range of self-expression. The new world, the new times, the new peoples, need a tongue according—yes, what is more, they will have such a tongue—will not be satisfied until it is evolved." He went back to this thought a score of times. One can find it amplified with a hundred suggestive phrases and variations in his An American Primer, a sketch for a lecture that was never delivered, a series of astonishing notes that extended over ten years. Here is an illuminating scrap:

> "I like limber, lasting, fierce words. I like them applied to myself—and I like them in newspapers, courts, debates, congress.—Do you suppose the liberties and the brawn of These States have to do only with delicate lady-words? with gloved gentleman words? . . . Bad Presidents, bad judges, bad editors, owners of slaves, monopolists, infidels, castrated persons, shaved persons, supplejacks, ecclesiastics . . . cry down the use of strong, cutting, beautiful, rude words. To the manly instincts of the People they will forever be welcome."

And here, in this half-musing, half-brusque fragment, the poet and propagandist join hands:

> What is the fitness—what the strange charm of aboriginal names?—Monongahela—It rolls with venison richness upon the palate. Among names to be revolutionized: that of the city of "Baltimore."

American writers, he prophesied, would learn to love their own land and the language that reflected it; they would show "far more freedom in the use

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of words. Ten thousand native idiomatic words are growing, or are already grown . . . words that would be welcomed by the nation, being of the national blood." And it was Whitman, with his prodigal energy and vulgar health, that blazed the way through a forest of pedantry and clichés.

The breadth, the jubilant acceptance, a rough-shod faith in life and death—these things led a regiment of writers out of sequestered gardens and worm-eaten towers, once labelled ivory. It was a new literature that followed; it flourished in the coarse sunlight and the keen air. It had strong roots in the earth; from its seeds sprang Frost, Sandburg, Dreiser, Oppenheim, Anderson, Masters, Lindsay and a score of autocthonous others. It was not so classic a thing as a renascence; it was a slow and painful birth. And thus one looks to the last of May. In the centenary of Whitman, American letters celebrates its own birthday.

LOUIS UNTERMEYER.

The Hours Movement in England

THE series of sporadic strikes which has broken out in the United Kingdom has, to a remarkable extent, a common character. In almost every case, the main demand for the strikers has been for a substantial reduction in working hours, and other demands have been, at least for the moment, secondary. Of course, there are deeper and more general causes behind the strikes, and their real significance cannot be fully measured in terms of any immediate demand; but the emergence of shorter hours as the leading issue of the moment is a fact of considerable importance.

It is generally recognized that the sporadic strikes which have taken place so far, even including the almost general cessation on the Clyde, are but the prelude to very much bigger movements to come. These bigger movements may or may not take the form of strikes; and it is certain that they will begin with a real attempt at a national settlement of the hours question without recourse to drastic action. What may happen subsequently will depend upon the attitude of the employers, and, still more, upon the attitude of the Government. Neither employers nor Government has as yet shown any aptitude or trace of constructive statesmanship in their handling of the problem; but it may still be hoped that they will achieve a broader outlook when the full gravity of the situation is realized.

The position at present is this. The forty-seven-hours week was accepted prematurely by the engineering trades and incorporated in a hastily and illdrafted agreement which left many crucial points unsettled. Subsequent attempts to settle these points have only made matters worse, and trouble first arose out of the widespread reduction of earnings which resulted from the working of the reduced hours without any increase in piecework prices. It is safe to say that there is now hardly any one among the trade union representatives who signed the forty-seven-hours agreement who does not regret his action, and admit that a further reduction of hours and an adjustment of piecework prices are imperatively required. Thus, while the executives repudiate the unofficial strikes precipitated by sections of their membership, they agree that the whole position calls for reconsideration. This, for instance, is the position adopted by the patternmakers' executive in a circular which they have just issued to their branches. The boilermakers and other shipyard Trade Unions have gone further, and are officially recognizing certain of the stoppages which have taken place.

The situation has been further aggravated by the decision of the Scottish Trades Union Congress, backed by several of the Scottish unions officially, and also by the Scottish districts of most of the British unions, in favor of a general strike movement for a forty-hours week, while at the same time there has been something like a general strike in Belfast for a forty-four-hours week, and trouble is threatening in other engineering centres, especially London. At the same time, there has been a railway strike in London, at first partly unofficial, but subsequently recognized, on the question of allowance for meal times in the eight-hours day (or forty-eight-hours week) which the Government has conceded to railway employees.

These are the immediate and obvious forms of unrest; but behind them are much larger movements which may well have come to a head before this article appears in print. The Miner's federation has presented to the Government an ultimatum demanding among other concessions the six-hours day for miners, and the representatives in Parliament intend to introduce at once a bill to amend the existing Eight Hours act so as to secure the six-hours day. The railwaymen are pressing for further concessions in the working of the eight-hours day which has already been granted in principle; and the Railway Clerks' association, which has just wrung a tardy "recognition" from the Government by the threat of an immediate strike, is demanding a thirty-six-hours week, or thirty-two hours on night

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work. The transport workers, including all branches of transport apart from the railways, are pressing through their Federation for a forty-four-hours week, and the National Federation of General Workers, which represents the less skilled workers and the workers employed in the smaller and more scattered industries, is also putting forward the same demand to all the Employers' Associations with which it has to deal. The trade unions in the woolen industry appear for the moment to have accepted a forty-eight-hours week; but the cotton workers, who now work more than fifty-four hours, are pressing for a reduction to forty-four. The bakers are urgently demanding the abolition of night work, and in short, there is hardly a trade in the country in which the unions concerned are not officially demanding a considerable reduction in hours.

In view of these facts, it is reasonable to regard the strikes which have so far taken place as premature movements which merely serve to indicate in advance the character of the coming unrest. The real governing factor in the present situation is the body known as the "Triple Alliance," or, more fully, the Triple Industrial Alliance of Miners, Railwaymen and Transport Workers. Each of the three groups which form the Alliance is at present busy negotiating either with the employers, or with the Government, or with both at once, and it seems clear that whether or not the mines and railways are nationally owned, the questions at issue are bound to resolve themselves into a struggle between the Triple Alliance and the Government. It is very possible that the struggle will be settled by negotiation, in the course of which the Government may be forced into the nationalization of mines and railways. In that case, it will not come to a strike, and probably a settlement between the Triple Alliance and the Government would go far to solve the hours problem in other industries also. Should a strike take place, clearly it could not last for long; but even a short strike of these three essential industries might well have the most tremendous consequences for the whole future of society.

There is obviously the greatest possible need for immediate action on the part of the Government to deal with the hours question on a national basis. Otherwise every trade in the country will certainly have its own dispute on the question, and the settlement of all these disputes will take a very long time and will indefinitely postpone the reorganization of industry. In face of the urgent demand of labor, something has to be done—and done at once. The big manufacturing and employing interests have met and passed a strong resolution urging the Government to do nothing to grant the demands that are being made until a full inquiry has reported on the ability of British industry to bear the shorter hours demand. In view of labor's very definite attitude, such resolutions are hardly helpful. A settlement must be reached soon, and it is the height of folly to attempt to postpone it to the distant future.

The main motives that have led to so urgent a demand on the part of labor are two-fold. Much the most important motive is the obvious one—the claim for more adequate leisure and a better chance to lead a pleasant and reasonable life. The demand for shorter hours is essentially a human demand, and one which must be met on human grounds. The overwork of war-time, which was itself but a continuation of the overwork of pre-war times, will not be allowed to continue any longer; and, in their determination to abolish it, the workers have been immensely strengthened by the revelation of our immense productive capacity which the war has furnished. It has also, of course, been reinforced by the spectacle of war profiteering, and is now being stimulated further by the astonishing activity of the Government in divesting the nation of its industrial property, and restoring to the full every form of private profiteering which it had been compelled by war-time necessities to restrain. The workers are sure—far surer than they have ever been—that there is wealth enough for everybody, given a just distribution of the national product, and given also a reasonable ordering of production.

Far behind the human motive in ultimate importance, but still a very material factor in the present situation, is the fear of unemployment and its effects, and a desire to secure the speedy absorption into industry both of the returning soldiers and of the war workers who are suffering discharge. The strength of this second motive varies very greatly from case to case. It is exceptionally strong in the mining industry, where great difficulty has already been experienced in absorbing the men returning from the army without displacing those already at work—a difficulty which has already led to several local strikes of importance. It is also important in the engineering and woodworking trades, which are bearing the brunt of war discharge, and also, strangely enough, in the building industry, which, thanks to the apathy of the Government, still shows no immediate sign of revival, despite the appalling shortage of houses. On the other hand, it naturally counts for little on the railways where every available man is still required.

There is in some quarters, especially among economists, a tendency to sneer at this motive, and to point out that it is "unsound economically" to reduce hours of labor in order to provide for the unemployed. The alternative, we are told, is the

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provision of work. This argument would be sound only if two conditions were fulfilled: first, if the prevailing hours of labor were already short enough; and secondly, if the Government had made in advance its preparations for the provision of alternative work. As neither of these conditions is fulfilled, surely the workers are fully justified in pressing for the immediate adoption of the shorter hours which they would in any case demand, and in using as an auxiliary argument the need for absorbing the unemployed.

There can be no doubt that the prevalence of the argument for shorter hours as a remedy for unemployment is in a great measure the result of the past propaganda of Mr. Tom Mann. For years past, that great mob-orator has assiduously preached the six-hours day as the means of abolishing unemployment, and, despite the protests of the economists, there can be no doubt that the idea has sunk into the minds of the workers. Mr. Tom Mann seems to have retired from active participation in the affairs of the Labor Movement; but the present strength of the demand for shorter hours is certainly attributable in a considerable degree, to his influence.

What, it will be asked, ought the Government of the United Kingdom to do in face of the present situation? I believe that it ought at once to announce and put into operation a comprehensive scheme for dealing with unemployment. But it ought to do more than this. It ought to tackle the whole hours question on a comprehensive basis, and to do for the industries of the country as a whole what it did under pressure for the miners some years before the war. The time is ripe for a universal Eight Hours act, applicable to all trades and callings, and including, of course, special provisions dealing with the hours of child labor. It would not be possible to settle details in such a measure; but, given the general principles and their intended application to weekly and daily employment, the various trades could readily work out the details for themselves. An Eight Hours act could, of course, only prescribe a maximum day: it would not prevent the miners, or any other industry having special conditions, from pressing for a lower maximum of hours; but it would bring order out of the present chaos of conflicting demands and provide general principles in which the various claims could be argued out. That would be an inestimable advantage, and may well be the only way of avoiding chaos.

The hours question has come to a head first in the United Kingdom; but it is, of course, far from being a merely national issue. The problem of the international regulation of the hours of labor forms one of the principal questions which will have to be dealt with by the Peace Conference, and the solution arrived at will have to be incorporated in the proposed International Labor charter. Moreover, it is more than probable that the hours question will be the principal factor in the industrial demands of labor in almost all civilized countries. There are already signs enough that it is in the forefront of labor's claims in other countries besides the United Kingdom. The lead which is now being given by organized labor in the United Kingdom will be followed up elsewhere; and if the British Government gives a lead in meeting that demand, its action also will be of international consequence. Among purely industrial labor questions, the hours question is at the present time by far the most important, and its importance is significant of the human character of the new demands of labor—of the insistence on the right not only to reasonable remuneration for work done, but also to reasonable leisure as an essential part of a reasonable "standard of living."

G. D. H. Cole.

The House of God

The organ groans laboriously. A hymn,
But half supported by the listlessness
Of many weary voices, dwindles away
Into the slow, dusk shadows. Overhead
The carven cherubs, nodding sleepily,
Smile, half disdainful; while the light,
Twisted and shattered by religious panes,
Transmutes the aisles to dusty labyrinths.
Silence—a drowsy murmur—then a man,
Pale, bleached and hazy, steps before the seats,
Compelling sleep in drowsy montones,
The while he queries vaguely: "Where is God?"
I softly yawn . . . where am I . . . Like a dim,
Unhappy dream that dawn turns fugitive;
The arches fade to nothing. Far away
I see the purple gleam of hills and hills,
Dipping and curving, graceful, to the sea
Which like a cerule mirror of the sky
Shows painted clouds and sunset and pure gold.
Now from the west a cool breeze lightly fans,
Whispering songs. Across the silver shield,
The ever widening ripples leap away
And all the sea flames points of dancing fire.
Twilight is come. Upon the cheek of Dusk,
The lovely blushes pale and disappear,
Mantling no more her beauty infinite.
The crumpled clouds assume a bluer shade
Against the lessening orange of the west,
And Night flings free her robe of amethyst,
Star Spangled, o'er the sea. Now the first star
Glints softly as I worship silently . . .
Where is it . . . was I dreaming? In a weight
Th' intolerable dullness crushes me.
Again, again I see the faded light
And feel the grotesque faces looking down
And laughing mirthlessly . . . Still the parched voice,
Oppressed by its own impotence drones on,
And heavily: "This is the house of God," it says.

Thomas C. Chubb.

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What to Read

AMONG the solid old-line professors there are a good many to criticize Thorstein Veblen. It is a pity that some such professor was not invited by the New York Times to attack Veblen's The Higher Learning in America instead of a pop-gun like Brander Matthews. The best that Brander Matthews does is a little pea-shooting at Mr. Veblen's grammar and rhetoric. Of mistakes in grammar and defects in style he makes everything he can. For the rest his review of this "memorandum on the conduct of universities by business men" is the fury of a partisan in acute pain. Professor Veblen, we are told, is not merely illiterate and condescending, he discloses "absolute ignorance of the institution he has taken for his topic," and his book "is unusual in its bad manners and perhaps, I should say, in its bad morals. There is a discourtesy very close to dishonesty in slandering by insinuation." Professor Matthews's discourtesy, it is clear, is of a different order. But isn't there something in the product of Professor Veblen's long and bitter experience as a teacher besides these horrible limitations? Can he be disposed of by this simple method of shrill abuse?

Thorstein Veblen stands above this kind of attack, but it is too typical of the degenerate condition of criticism in academic America. For years Veblen has been one of the most salient social critics in America, yet instead of living in an atmosphere of healthy recognition he has been a pilgrim in the wilderness, trailed by a bunch of over-heated admirers. His style is beyond doubt one result of his experience. It is a cactus style. But healthy recognition would have done a great deal to change that. When one thinks of the prompt recognition that is granted to the shrewdly compliant professor, and the cold dubiety that greets a subversive critic like Veblen, the sickening atmosphere of professorial cowardice is unmistakable. To this patent fact Professor Matthews pays no attention. He is content to complain that Veblen is ungrammatical and obscure. More correct and more suave Veblen surely could be, yet suavity is not everything. There is, after all, the impeccable suavity of the pimp.

It is a question, however, whether the entirely smooth and grammatical Bertrand Russell will be more to Mr. Matthews's liking. And here again, with his new book Proposed Roads to Freedom, Mr. Russell shows the dire need of that sympathetic criticism which is the best part of healthy recognition. This new book is certainly one that ought to be widely read but the sophisticated can hardly help being disappointed with it. Its merit is the perfect pedagogic clarity with which it informs the busy laymen of the roots from which guild socialism and syndicalism sprout. Its defect is the superficial nature of Mr. Russell's inquiry into anarchism and socialism. His historical sketch, to go no further, is popular in the bad sense that it is unquestioningly derived from handy sources. It is not searching or scientific. But besides the historical sketch and the lambent dissertation that follows it there is a wise and beautiful introduction. Admirers of the mathematician in Bertrand Russell have good reason to criticize the Bertrand Russell who writes politics. Much may be forgiven him, however, for the introduction to this volume.

Bertrand Russell is not the only practised penman writing about politics who deserves to be reproached as "literary." How about Bernard Shaw's articles in the New York American? He started off incomparably. Now that I cannot hurt the sacred cause, he practically said, I shall reveal the facts you haven't grasped. You were so fed up on vital lies that you supposed Germany could win? Ah, mes enfants, how natural and yet how naive! Never from the start had Germany a chance. Byng at Cambrai? The French from March to July in 1917? Merely the old British lion pretending to snooze. Gallipoli? A bagatelle. The Rumanian collapse? A tiny sideslip. So Mr. Shaw started out to shake up our conceptions, to depict an inefficient and infatuated Germany and an irresistible Britain. Not only that but he set out to mock the idea of Britain's unpreparedness and Britain's "Liberal" foreign policy, all with the idea of demonstrating that without a League of Nations the elimination of Germany could do no good at all. So far I do not think the articles have come off. As Anti-British Hearst propaganda, yes. Their honesty as to British realism is Hearst's reason for printing them. But Mr. Shaw's air of explaining the whole war, "now you see it and now you don't," arouses expectations he has failed to fulfil. All he has to divulge is this: unless we arrange to prevent future wars, this war will leave militarism and navalism intact. His latest articles, asking for a revolution in the soul of man, seem equally inconclusive. "Two extremes," said Pascal, "to exclude reason, and to admit nothing but reason." Mr. Shaw is illustrating both extremes.

Pascal, by the way, would have had a hard time with Mr. Burleson. Nearly three centuries ago he got off this little squib. "'Why do you kill me?' 'What, do you not live on the other side of the water? My friend, if you lived on this side, I should be an assassin, and it would be wrong to kill you thus; but since you live on the other side, I am a brave man, and it is a lawful act.'" The evidence is plain that Pascal was constructively a pro-German.

A brave attempt is to be made by a group of London artists and writers to bring out Art and Letters as a new and enlarged quarterly. Price 10/6 a year, address 9 Duke street, Adelphi, London, W. C. 2. Among the authors and artists are Lytton Strachey, Siegfried Sassoon, Wyndham Lewis, Richard Aldington, T. S. Eliot, Frank Rutter, Walter Sickert. "To pay our contributors adequately," their circular says, "we need at least 5,000 subscribers. If the forty-five millions of this nation cannot support our obviously serious efforts to this extent, there is only one logical thing left for artists to do. That is to form an inclusive union of the intelligentsia and advocate with our irresistible power *racial suicide*. We are confident that such a tragic employment of our energies will be unnecessary." The after-the-war gayety of this circular leads one to hope for the quarterly. If the Little Review had something of this same gayety, its anti-philistinism would be less obnoxious. But that intense anti-philistinism is simply another manifestation of our native puritanical spirit.

Yet even the Little Review, it must be recorded, has its prudery. Unless rumor is wrong, the editor of that stimulating periodical is blue-pencilling James Joyce's serial, Ulysses. Thus is the memory of Anthony Comstock vindicated. But James Joyce's literary excesses, marked as they are, are not like his venerable countryman's, George Moore. "Rotten speeches," as a sagacious Englishman put it, "are worst in withered age, when men run after that sin in their words which flieth from them in the deed."

SALANN.

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Sampling Mr. A. J. Balfour's Mind

The Mind of Arthur James Balfour. Selections from his non-political writings, speeches and addresses, 1879-1917. Including special sections on America and Germany. Selected and arranged by Wilfrid M. Short. New York: George H. Doran Co. $2.50.

NO man, if the proverb may be trusted, is a hero to his valet, but Mr. A. J. Balfour has succeeded in being a hero at least to his private secretary. Mr. Short's hero-worship led him to publish, some years ago, a volume called Arthur James Balfour as Philosopher and Thinker, which at least justified its title by consisting of extracts from Mr. Balfour's genuinely philosophical books and articles. But when it befell that Mr. Balfour came to this country as head of the British mission, "it was pointed out" to the enthusiastic Mr. Short "that many Americans would like to possess this record of Mr. Balfour as Philosopher and Thinker." Mr. Short, "rejoicing" at his "privilege" of presenting choice samples of his hero's mind to the Great American Public, set to work rearranging his feast of reason to suit the varied and less intellectual tastes of his new audience. As a result, the bulk of the philosophy has evaporated, and Mr. Balfour's mind, alphabetically ordered, is found to be just about as miscellaneous in contents as a New York department store. Sameness of initials makes strange bedfellows. Beauty reposes between Bacon and Bergson, and the Bible is jostled by Bishop Berkeley and Bobbie Burns. Darwin is next to Decadence, and Germany next to Golf. The Press and Progress are closer companions in this book than they are in life, and those who like to change the subjects of their thoughts abruptly, may pass from Fashion straight to the Foundations of Belief. The biggest dullard will be able to get a taste of Mr. Balfour's quality as a "thinker" from his ponderous jocularity on the humors of golf; and those who enjoy the solemn pomposities of official life will read the Tributes to Queen Victoria, Gladstone, Salisbury and others, with which the volume closes, without discovering that much rotundity of sound but thinly veils much poverty of sense. It is a maxim of modern scientific method that, if you want to know a collection by sampling it, you must make sure that your samples are "fair." But Mr. Short seems to have thought less of sampling Mr. Balfour at his best, which is very good, than of providing scraps to suit every taste. The inclusion of many ephemeral trivialities is the result. More illuminating than anything in this book will be to many Americans the fact that, after denying the very existence of an Irish nation for over thirty years, Mr. Balfour discovered the unanswerable justice of Home Rule on his visit to this country; just as all England became acquainted with his unchallenged supremacy as an intellectual tight-rope dancer during the days of Chamberlain's Tariff Reform Campaign. It was the greatest game of political hide-and-seek known in the history of popular government. Month after month with amused expectancy men waited for a decisive declaration. In speech after speech Mr. Balfour would boldly advance to the point, and in seemingly transparent phrases define his position. But the more you thought over these phrases next morning, the more baffling they became. You turned them this way, you looked at them that way, and found yourself as wise as before. Whether in politics or in philosophy, Mr. Balfour's name will go down to history as the most subtle and accomplished of dialecticians, unerring in his thrust for the weakness in his opponent's armor, but eluding himself every attempt to pin him down against his will. The extracts on Treitschke and on Bergson in this volume will illustrate how nimbly he wields the critic's rapier, and how deadly is his lunge.

But it is the philosopher rather than the politician whom the best extracts in this book seek to set before us. "Philosophy," as Mr. Balfour himself observes, "is nearly as likely to be done in early as in later life." The remark applies with singular precision to his own contributions to philosophy. He discovered his mine of thought as a young man and exhausted it in his first book, A Defence of Philosophic Doubt, published in 1879 when he was but thirty-one years of age. It is both his earliest and his best work. The Foundations of Belief, which appeared in 1895, presents substantially the same material with few additions or qualifications. In the Gifford Lectures of 1916 on Theism and Humanism the old limpidity of style reveals but too obviously how the thought has worn thin. The lode had been worked out long ago, the gold extracted. Barely a nugget here and there rewards the renewal of the toil. But the genuineness of the original strike is undeniable. There is no more polished, incisive, annihilating examination in the English language of all the contemporary tendencies of thought which Mr. Balfour sums up in the word "Naturalism"—from Comte's Positivism, to Mill's Phenomenalism and Spencer's Agnosticism—than his Defense of Philosophic Doubt. It is not natural science, but the philosophy of science, which Mr. Balfour attacks. Like Kant, he might have said of himself, "I had to point out the limitations of science in order to make room for faith." His single thesis throughout is that the recognition of *values*—moral, aesthetic, religious, even intellectual (the value of knowledge and truth)—is incompatible with the premises of Naturalism; that on a naturalistic basis the very existence of these values, or at least the devotion of men to these values, is unintelligible. He makes the same point against Bergson. "If values are to be taken into account, it is surely better to invoke God with a purpose than a supra-consciousness (the élan vital) with none." He thus belongs to the company of all those thinkers who oppose to Naturalism a spiritual interpretation of the universe. He ranks himself definitely with the "mystics." But he differs from most others in this company by adopting as the corrective of Naturalism the Theism of orthodox religion. God as the First Cause; God as creator and designer; God's purpose working in the world, if not exactly by miracles, yet still as a "special providence" shaping the course of things; God as the source of man's belief in God, these are his positive notes. Yet the bulk of his thinking is negative. His heart is in the demolition of Naturalism, not in the constructive interpretation of religion. To theology as a positive doctrine he makes no single contribution. Philosophy, in his hands, is a weapon to destroy the enemies of the faith, but the door of the temple once safely gained, the armor of the intellect is laid aside, the unsparing thinker becomes the unquestioning Christian, the bold dialectician reposes in a child-like faith. "Authority" takes the place of "reasoning." From the insufficiency of Naturalism he seeks refuge in the sufficiency of Christianity, content to have shown that the intellectual difficulties of the former are as great as, if not greater, than, those of the latter, and making no attempt to deal with the problems of religion on their merits. Without a belief in God, the world is to thought an unintelligible chaos, to life a scene of meaningless effort. So much we can see. The rest is mystery.

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The very existence of natural science is intelligible only if we postulate a "Deity working by preferential methods." For though science claims to come by reasoning, it turns out everywhere to rest on beliefs held on non-rational grounds. From the naturalistic point of view, what is reason, anyway? It is but "a merely local accident ranking after appetite and instinct among the expedients by which the existence of a small class of mammals on a very insignificant planet is rendered a little less brief." From the spiritual point of view, the way in which the non-rational bases of reason—physical, physiological, social—conspire to yield knowledge, can be understood only on the assumption that Supreme Reason shaped them to that end by its preferential guidance. Thus science needs God as much as does morality.

But morality needs not only God, but the incarnation of God in man as well. This is one of the few points where Mr. Balfour comes to grips with one of the central mysteries of the Christian faith, and even then he does not so much interpret a mystery as supply motives for swallowing a dogma. Without a belief in incarnation, the immensity of the material universe in space and time would dwarf man to utter insignificance. Only the revelation of God through man reverses the balance. Again, only if incarnation be a fact, are we saved from the humiliation, the discouragement of all high endeavor, which would else flow from the absolute dependence of our minds on our bodies. Lastly, it is the one refuge from the pessimism begotten of the experience of evil, for it makes God a fellow-sufferer and no mere indifferent spectator of our aims and sorrows.

These arguments may or may not smooth the path to belief for perplexed souls. At any rate, they exhibit in the clearest light Mr. Balfour's fundamental attitude. What he demands of philosophy is a theory which shall show the universe to be in harmony with man's moral needs and religious aspirations. "If we, then, regard the Universe in which we have to live as a mere web of connected phenomena, created for no object, informed by no purpose, stamped with no marks of design other than those which can be imitated by Natural Selection, I see no ground for the faith that all honest effort will work together for the production of a regenerate man and a perfected society." Hence we must believe in God. Hence we must hold to immortality. Hence we must condemn Naturalism as much for its moral insufficiency as for its intellectual inconsistency. "It so dwarfs," he exclaims, "and impoverishes the ideal end of human effort, that though it may encourage us to die with dignity, it hardly permits us to live with hope." He weighs the Positivist's "religion of humanity" in the balance against Christianity and finds it wanting. "It cannot penetrate and vivify the inmost life of ordinary humanity. There is in it no nourishment for ordinary human souls, no comfort for ordinary human sorrow, no help for ordinary human weakness. Not less than the crudest irreligion does it leave us men divorced from all communion with God, face to face with the unthinking energies of nature which gave us birth, and into which, if supernatural religion be indeed a dream, we must after a few fruitless struggles be again resolved."

To many this revelation of Mr. Balfour's deepest mind will be startling. How are we to explain it? Was he a pragmatist long before William James—practising the will to believe, preferring the articles of the Christian faith as emotionally more satisfying than any other interpretation of the world? No, he is too subtle for that. Is he merely a typical example of England's land-owning, church-going Tory aristocracy, having never overhauled his religion in the naked light of day? Again, he is too subtle for that. Nor can there be any doubt of his sincerity. This mysticism rooted in a traditional faith, this reliance on something deeper than reasoning—these are the essential Mr. Balfour. Perhaps the simplest explanation is the true one. Is it so hard to imagine that a statesman, for all his appearance of power and knowledge, should be profoundly conscious of being the plaything rather than the master of forces the issues of which he can neither foresee nor control? Is it quite unintelligible that he should feel the need of a trust in the universe which only religion can give? Perhaps he agrees with H. G. Wells's Joan: "If there isn't a Hell, what does God do?"

R. F. A. H.

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The Book of Jade

Chinese Lyrics from the Book of Jade, Translated from the French of Judith Gautier by James Whitall. New York: B. W. Huebsch. $1.00.

IF the Greeks had left us nothing but their epigrams we should have known just as certainly that their genius was for form. The Chinese literature which has so far reached us is made up of brief drifting lyrics with a popular significance within the sacred city such as the epigram had in Corinth. The brevities of the two civilizations are surprisingly alike in mood and philosophy. Both Greek and Chinese catch at the brightest streamers of the passing days, sate themselves frankly with what joys they can compass, and look sadly though unflinchingly into the eyes of old age and death. The dissimilarity is in method, or in the

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habit of thinking. There is never an illogical epigram; there is hardly a logical Chinese poem. These fragments from the Book of Jade are as evasive and vagrant as a child's memory. They delight in getting gracefully nowhere. Take the Song on the River by Li-Taï-Pé,

My boat is of ebony;
The holes in my flute are golden.

As a plant takes out stains from silk,
So wine takes sadness from the heart.

When one has good wine,
A graceful boat,
And a maiden's love,
Why envy the immortal gods?

Here the form is indeterminable; the exquisite finish furnishes coherence. The method is that of intangible suggestions that touch the topic in hand obliquely, inexplicably. We can no more unravel them than the geometry of reflected light among distant stars.

Like the epigrams again these lyrics were fugitive for centuries, scrawled upon gates and walls or passed from hand to hand until some Braithwaite of the Mongols, reviewing centuries instead of years, compiled the most popular of them into the Book of Jade. They do not make up a body of national tradition, as does a collection of Scotch ballads, but a bouquet of whims characteristic of a culture.

The marvel is that so fragile a charm has been preserved through the vicissitudes of double translation. It is probably true that if they were not still authentic in their appeal they would not sound authentic, which they assuredly do. Yet Judith Gautier translated them from the Chinese into French, and James Whitall translated them from French into English. One has a vague feeling that the round-about practice should not be encouraged, but it would be hard to find grounds for objection in this instance unless one knew the originals and found them to be gravely injured in the process. For the lyrics as they stand are exceedingly beautiful. They are a realization of what the Imagists have never quite succeeded in doing. To be sure, their themes are remote, languorous, effete, everything our civilization has not and does not want. It is something of an affectation for the poets of a young and robust nation to sing these things, and they sing them, if at all, with a touch of self-contempt. Imagism is a celebration of surfaces, and it is only the cynically old, or the pulselessly neurotic, who find their realities in surfaces alone. Let us drink and make love and look at beautiful things, these poets of China say, for tomorrow there is nothing. They find in themselves no values other than the capacity for sensation. Tchang-Tsi says it very well in Mid-River:

In my boat, rocked by the river,
Gently rocked while the daylight lasts,
I row and I gaze at the mountains,
Glassed in the water.

I have now no other love
But the love of wine,
And my cup full of wine is before me.

Once I had in my heart a thousand sorrows,
But now . . .
I look at the mountains,
Glassed in the water.

In this philosophy the turgid, eager emotion of lyrics in German and English finds place only as a forgotten folly. Once I dreamed and desired and was unhappy, but now I only hear and taste and see, and it is enough. But the burden of this song is no nearer finality than the unrest of our own. It sounds final because it is content, advocating nothing. And not even China will remain content forever.

M. A.

The Golden Forties

The Forty-niners, by Stewart Edward White. New Haven: Yale University Press. $3.50.

VOLUME 25 of the Chronicles of America Series is history written by a novelist, exposition carefully constructed by a man who hankers to be writing narrative. The result is not inaccurate impressionism, for Stewart Edward White is conscientious and thoroughly awake to his difficulty—but a colorless chronicle, enlivened only here and there by the flash of characterization or the instructive dramatization of events. No doubt Mr. Whie was oppressed by the sense of having written extravagantly picturesquely of the forty-niners as he imagined them, and resolved grimly that his history should smack not at all of the creative artist. When he succeeds in hewing to the strict line of fact the effort is apparent in every cramped and ingrown sentence. It is all well-known ground to him, and his manner takes on the weary flatness of the tired museum guide. In the midst of the most extraordinary and moving happenings he is cool, casual, often statistical. It is evident that when he treats the gold rush as history, it is dry bones to him, and he makes it so for the rest of us. Perhaps it was an impossible labor to compress the vigor and rich life of the argonauts into a single volume. At all events The Forty-niners takes most of the romance out of its subject, and would leave us, but for its ending, looking down with a bored air on these unscrupulous, gold-hungry, rough-bearded insects, in the attitude of a scientist who has just poked something curious with a twig.

But in the chapter on the Panama Route, and in the last quarter of the book, given over to the Vigilantes of '56, the subjects take hold of the author and wrench him out of his detachment. There was new material in the descriptions of Panama, and he made the most of it. The chapters on the Vigilantes are based on authorities, but they are dramatic narrative, swift and telling. Mr. White ceases here to be a bold historian and becomes a clever romancer, with a subject ready-lived to his hand. He may have intended to end up in this fashion, but it seems more probable that his will was worn out with the resisting of incessant temptation, and when he came upon that maliciously upright character, James King of William, founder of the stormy Evening Bulletin—the alluring possibilities were too much for him. As a result, the Vigilantes of '56 overshadow the authentic pioneers. It is one thing to read for general information, and quite another to read because of a compelling interest in the fate of a certain daring editor. We get the earlier adventurers en masse, but William T. Coleman and James King emerge as full-length heroes, facing the disreputable Law and Order faction in an extended struggle for justice denied in the courts.

The Forty-niners hesitates between two kinds of history. It sets out in the school of Grote, and goes over precipitately to Carlyle. The limitations of the series for which it was prepared have been sadly hampering in its

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preparation, for both the subject and the author would profit by greater range. A purely discursive writer, set to the brief presentation of a period made noteworthy by the wealth of its incidents and the unusual flavor of the legends that have grown up about it, could hardly be expected to get the picture in perspective. There was a colossal communal daring, a prodigality of experience about the early Californians that cannot be set forth in a compact essay. The age is better suggested in its discredited myths than in its accredited history. Mr. White's own fiction has come much nearer the essential spirit of the times than his half-hearted, well-considered summary. But if what he has done with the Vigilantes could be done for the epoch, we should be more likely to read the resultant ten volumes, and return to them, than we are to return even in thought to this one after we have dutifully read it.

Can Such Things Be? by Ambrose Bierce. New York: Boni & Liveright. $1.50.

THIS is the second volume of an edition in which the publishers propose to include the best of Bierce. The first, In the Midst of Life, contained those powerful stories of Civil War incidents and experiences which definitely gave Bierce his high rank in American literature as a merciless realist. This collection exhibits the author as an artist in the tale of mystery and horror. Some of the stories here reprinted have become classic: The Damned Thing, A Jug of Syrup, The Moonlight Road; and The Middle Toe of the Right Foot. These four, together with the opening tale, The Death of Halpin Frayser, are easily the best in the book. One or two numbers in that fine set of stories by H. G. Wells, The Country of the Blind, curiously recall in theme, atmosphere and technique the mood of such a typical Bierce achievement as The Damned Thing. Here are the closing sentences in which Hugh Morgan is endeavoring to make clear to himself what The Damned Thing really is: " . . . As with sounds, so with colors. At each end of the solar spectrum the chemist can detect the presence of what are known as 'actinic' rays. They represent colors—integral colors in the composition of light—which we are unable to discern. The human eye is an imperfect instrument; its range is but a few octaves of the real chromatic scale. I am not mad; there are colors that we cannot see.

"And, God help me! the Damned Thing is of such a color!"

That passage might have been quoted without change of word from the private papers of one of those imaginative, adventurous, and highly-strung scientists whom Wells used to set before us with such alertness and fidelity in his earlier experiments in fiction. The realist author of In the Midst of Life has been variously and insistently compared with Stendahl, Tolstoi, and Zola. Bierce, specialist in the grotesque and terrible, deserves his place beside Edgar Allan Poe. H. A. L.

Contributors

WILLIAM HARD, a regular contributor to the New Republic.

W. P. CROZIER, a writer on military and naval topics for the Manchester Guardian.

G. D. H. COLE, an English authority on the labor question, who has written several books, among them Labor in Wartime and Self-Government in Industry.

KATE MULLEN, a former teacher who is interested in politics and suffrage.

LOUIS UNTERMEYER, poet and critic.

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The New
REPUBLIC
A Supplement to the Issue of
March 22nd 1919

The Political Scene

by WALTER LIPPMANN

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PART TWO

VOL. XVIII: NO. 229

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The Political Scene

I. The Task at Paris

IT looks as if a large number of Americans were thoroughly frightened at what a world war can do to the world. Curiously enough this state of fear seems to exist among those who not only were heart and soul for the war themselves, but were convinced that they were a little more heart and soul for it than anyone else. They expected better of this war, and they are really rather disappointed at the way things are working themselves out. They had anticipated, that once the Hun was licked, the world would automatically return, if not to righteousness, at least to something rather like what it enjoyed in the days when the Kaiser was still flattering millionaires and professors. Instead they discover Mr. Wilson engaged in making a peace that to them passeth all understanding; instead of the comfort of having won and letting the other fellow worry, it seems to be the the victors who have to perform the extremely complicated and unmistakably dangerous task of setting the earth to rights. The old idea that to the victor belong the spoils, has turned into the victor's duty of listening to everybody's troubles. Not only that. His duties do not end with listening, but do actually involve a mass of responsibility for the future of which it is fair to say most Americans had no notion when they entered the war. They did not suppose that so many things would be irrevocably changed. "War measures"—the vast interruptions necessary to the fight, they endured without murmuring, but now they would like to resume.

It becomes clearer every day that the war was not an interruption which will end with the end of the war. For the plain fact is that international relations as they existed in 1914 were almost completely determined by the military imperialisms of which Prussia was the chief. And until we master the fact that the empires of Hohenzollern, Hapsburg, Sultan and Czar were the foundations of law and order in Europe before 1914, we shall not understand either the meaning of their destruction, or the consequences of our own victories. They were the basis of "peace," such as it was, and of normal conditions, as men suffered them. Only America seemed to lie outside the orbit of their influence, and this proved in the end to be a delusion. The ambitions, intrigues, necessities, and tyrannies of those empires were the point of reference for all the world. They set the pace in armaments. Those towering systems of power necessitated the building of another system of power to balance them. The character of the competition they created in the backward portions of the globe stimulated an imitative competition. It did not matter who liked their game or hated it. They made the game, and reluctantly or otherwise the game was played.

From Prussian Germany came the example of how to modernize and make a success of ideas at which this generation was inclined to jeer. She was not the first of the imperial despotisms, nor altogether unique either in manners or morals. Where her peculiar danger lay was that in all the others there had arisen controlling popular forces, or, as in Russia, the administration of tyranny was collapsing through sheer incompetence. But Prussia was competent, and because of that competence she threatened to erect a dazzling modern triumph out of ideas which lingered only fitfully in the dusty corners of stale chancelleries. She came uncomfortably close not only to making her will the law of three continents, but to making her ideas the pattern of conventional human thought. She almost demonstrated how tyranny could be made successful and on a world-wide scale.

Her downfall brought down with it the hopes of those feebler empires which existed as competitors or vassals or imitators, and made a mockery of those empires which existed in the dreams and propaganda of hopeful jingoes. 'Europe,' as it presented itself to the old-school diplomat, is gone. The continent is still there, most of the population is still there, to be sure, but Europe as a diplomatic system is hopelessly gone. Its organization from the Rhine to the Pacific, from the North Sea to the Moslem world is broken, and all the subsidiary organizations which leaned upon it, and against it, are suspended on nothing. Only small groups of far-seeing men have comprehended even partially that this is what the "victoire intégrale" would mean; that victory would compel us to make a new framework for human society. It is no wonder, then, that many elder statesmen, educated in that ruined order, should still act for the ideas which belonged to it, that Baron Sonnino should behave like a diplomat of the Triplice, or M. Pasič should be puzzled by the younger Serbs, that M. Pichon should have forgotten nothing but a little of what democratic France has professed.

The meaning of complete victory was certainly not known to those statesmen who wrote the secret

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treaties and memoranda which passed between the Allies in 1915 and 1916. To be sure, the execution of what they claimed would have required clear victory over the Central Powers. But although the victory was to be decisive, it was somehow to change nothing very radically. These documents belonged in spirit to a world in which Prussia was temporarily defeated, but in which Prussianism survived as the pacemaker of Europe. Moreover, they presupposed an easy victory—a victory which did not wrack every nation to its depths, and call forth the suppressed energies of revolution. They were written under the double illusion that the Europe of Sazanov, Sonnino, the Quai d'Orsay and the Morning Post was strong enough to defeat the German Empire—and that having defeated her, Europe could carry on as before. Events proved that Prussia could not be replaced by paler reflections of herself. For in destroying her, it was necessary to awaken dormant peoples and submerged classes and the western hemisphere.

Why anyone should suppose that it was possible to tear down the authority which ruled in central and eastern Europe without producing disorder, it is difficult to understand. We have torn down authority. We have willed to tear it down. It was a vile authority, but it was the existing authority in law and in fact. We sent two million men to France with orders to tear it down, to crush it beyond hope of resurrection. And when you tear down, you have torn down. We started to destroy a supremely evil thing and it is destroyed. The result of destroying it is destruction, and what is left are fragments, and possibilities, the stirrings of new life long suppressed, old hopes released, old wrongs being avenged, and endless agitation. It is chaos by every standard of our thinking, wild and dangerous, perhaps infectious, and thoroughly uncomfortable. But we cannot, having deliberately torn a central part of the world order to pieces, leave the wreckage in a panic and whimper that it is dreadful. Nor can we cure it, or save ourselves, by calling everybody who examines it dispassionately some idiotic name like pro-German and Bolshevik.

It calls for imagination to picture just what has happened to Europe and the world by the disappearance of its imperial organizations. We find ourselves in a world where four of the eight or nine centres of decisive authority have collapsed; where hundreds of millions of people have been wrenched from their ancient altars of obedience; where the necessities of bare existence are scarce, and precariously obtained. These people have lost homes, children, fathers. They are full of rumor and fear, and subject to every gust of agitation. Their leaders are untried, their lands undefined, their class interests and property in a jumble, they cannot see ahead three weeks with assurance. It was inevitable that it should be so, once the decision was taken to destroy autocracy to its foundations. For Prussian Germany was the last strong source of authority in Eastern Europe, and the only bulwark of absolutism to which the old order could turn for help.

II. Peace as of January 1918

IN the winter of 1917-18 there were men in all countries who saw this, and urged a compromise with the Prussian state.

It is no secret now that a combination of conservatism and war-weariness nearly brought the conflict to an indecisive end some time between June, 1917, and March, 1918. The summer months had been a time of deep depression in France after the military failure of the spring. In July the German Reichstag passed its famous 'Majority Resolution'; in early August the Pope made his appeal; everywhere Stockholm was debated. Kerensky's failure was already apparent, and although Pershing was in France, he was a general without an army. Caporetto was followed swiftly by Byng's failure at Cambrai and by the Bolshevist revolution. There was no longer an eastern front. The Italian front seemed to be a liability; Saloniki was regarded cynically as a great Allied internment camp. Within the Central Powers there were undoubted signs of popular revolt, which called forth a certain feeble response from the Emperor Charles and Count Czernin.

By Christmas the yearning for peace had risen high in all countries, and the opening of the parleys at Brest-Litovsk stirred men deeply. Beneath the surface the efforts at peace were continual: General Smuts had gone to meet Count Mensdorff in Switzerland; Mr. Lloyd George and Lord Milner were inclined to abandon Russia, and Lord Landsdowne had definitely announced that if " civilization "—i. e. the old European order, was to be maintained, an immediate peace was necessary. All the while Ludendorff was moving divisions to the western front. The ten weeks from December first to mid-February were the time of supreme decision. They saw the final attempt to save the old system and avert European revolution.

Three figures dominated it: Ludendorff, Clemenceau and Wilson. The choice lay between a peace which yielded to Germany the organization of the East and a frightful military gamble on the western front, the issue of which no man could foresee. Clemenceau forced the issue, and because he succeeded he will belong to the assembly of great men. Wilson's position was more complicated. He never for an instant yielded to the suggestion of an unclean peace at the expense of Russia, but he had been affected by the reports of feeling in England, by the spectacle of the early days at Brest-Litovsk, he had by December acquired interest in the Reichstag Resolution of July; and he had a certain lingering hope in Czernin. He did not intend to yield to Prussia, but he did undoubtedly see that unless the Allied cause were morally unified by diplomacy, the combined peace and military offensives from Berlin and Vienna might disintegrate the Allied peoples.

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More than that, he too was willing to gamble. Ludendorff and Clemenceau were set for a death struggle in which all might be lost. He determined to try the diplomatic adventure of offering a separate peace to Austria.

It was for this setting that the Congressional Addresses of December fourth and January eighth were prepared. The invitation to Czernin was plain:

"We owe it, however, to ourselves to say that we do not wish in any way to impair or to rearrange the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It is no affair of ours what they do with their own life, either industrially or politically."

Early in January Mr. Lloyd George spoke in the same vein, thus abandoning for the moment the clear purpose of the Allied reply to the President a year previous. Mr. Wilson followed with the address of January eighth in which he offered to negotiate with representatives of the Reichstag majority on the basis of the Fourteen Points. It was as events showed a summons to the dead, for the majority had disappeared by that time, and the abortive strikes of early January had made Ludendorff military dictator of Germany.

It is a very significant fact that the project of a League of Nations is merely the Fourteenth of the articles, and is treated as a kind of seal upon the peace when made. Clearly Mr. Wilson had not yet arrived at the conclusion that the League is a *means* of making peace as well as a guarantee when peace has been made. The reason is that the Fourteen Points were conceived as a just settlement in a world not radically different in structure from that out of which the war had arisen. This was the only kind of peace possible in January, 1918. At bottom it would have been an Agreement of the Powers, and nothing more. But the peace which has actually to be initiated in Paris today is the result of the 1918 campaign. The Fourteen Points were written before that campaign was fought, and that campaign in its military, diplomatic, and social phases was the most penetrating conflict in modern history. Its conclusion was radical, and out of it nothing less could result than the necessity of creating a new framework for international society. The decision to fight that campaign meant that the world had burned its bridges.

They were not burned in the Fourteen Points. The sharpest proof of this is to be found in Article II, which reads:

"Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants."

This article opens with an attempt to safeguard the rights of neutrals. That much of it supposes a world not controlled by a League of Nations. But the portion beginning "except as the seas may be closed" foreshadows article XVI of the constitution drafted at Paris where the boycott is provided as a sanction. As the proposition stood on January eighth it seems to imply united and occasional action by the League. Above all it recognized war as a normal institution. In the document from Paris the League's action is virtually complete.

I venture this criticism simply because it illustrates a truth of special importance to us at this moment: that the war became revolutionary (in the exact sense of the word) only as a result of the 1918 campaign; that previously statesmen saw the League of Nations as a useful annex to the structure of peace; that after 1918 it became the central framework of the structure.

Early last winter the best that leading statesmen planned was a balance of claims, an adjustment of a few outstanding grievances, and the acceptance of a number of general principles resting upon nothing more than common agreement. That is why the territorial sections of Mr. Wilson's programme are in so far as they affect the Great Powers chiefly self-denying ordinances. The reference to Alsace-Lorraine is carefully phrased so as to exclude the annexation of the Saar basin, for it is the wrong of 1871 and not the wrong of 1815 which is to be righted. Italy's portion conspicuously ignores strategic considerations; the Russian section avoids mention of the border nations, and except for the establishment of Poland, assumes a reconstitution of the former boundaries of the Empire. Serbia is promised the outlet so long denied her, but Jugo-Slavia is not mentioned because the Austro-Hungarian empire's integrity is presupposed. Rumania retains her old boundaries vis-à-vis Hungary. The Czecho-Slovaks do not appear at all. The dismemberment of Turkey is not specified, and the only new state definitely demanded is Poland. Here the phrase "indisputably Polish populations" expressly precludes those geographical fantasies which reach into Lithuanian and Ukranian territory.

Finally the Fourteen Points do not deal with the mechanism of economic life which the shortage of ships, food and materials compelled the Allies to organize in 1918. That mechanism barely existed when the Points were formulated. Its bearing upon the whole peace was not understood then except by a few far-sighted men like Mr. Dwight Morrow and Mr. George Rublee. Its bearing is not adequately realized today, as the constitution of the League indicates. Mr. Wilson's ideal, then as now, both in international and in domestic affairs was that New Freedom which is the Old Manchester. But even the fighting edge of that ideal—"the removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers" has been blunted by the discovery that not much removal is possible.

The practice of international cooperation in trade advanced extraordinarily in 1918. But the political appreciation of it lags behind, and we approach the modern period with a new politics and an unrevised industrialism. Not all of our thinking is as swift as events.

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III. Absolute Victory

REFORM, not reconstruction, was the intention a little over a year ago. But Germany under Ludendorff had no such tame ambition. Facing towards the East she assessed the materials of empire from Finland to Turkestan. Instead of the comparatively modest project of Hamburg to Bagdad she toyed with a bewildering choice of routes and markets and materials and jobs across the Ukraine to the Caucasus. Such a jig-saw puzzle of thrones and concessions never delighted the mind of the craziest diplomat. The only difficulty was that the Allies on the west had hold of Germany's coat tails. To shake them off Ludendorff determined to strike in Picardy for the Empire of the East.

His margin of reserves and materials was too small; a superiority of a little over 300,000 bayonets was not enough to complete the break through. But it was enough to frighten the Allies into unity, and bring America enormously to France. By June 15, in spite of the defeat in Champagne, Foch commanded more fighting men than Ludendorff, and the superiority was steadily growing. The German government undoubtedly knew the figures, and a little over a week later Kühlmann made his extraordinary speech renouncing military victory while the German army was bombarding Paris. The aggressive faction in Allied circles had guessed a German weakness from the diminished intensity of the June battles west of Soissons, and so a counter-offensive was planned. It was even believed at the end of June, and so prophesied, that the German collapse might occur by the end of September. Three objectives were laid down—the reduction of the salients at Montdidier, the Marne, and St. Mihiel. Then through excellent intelligence work on the part of the French, the German attack of mid-July was completely foreseen, and brilliantly smashed by General Gouraud's army. The Allied offensive opened immediately, with extraordinary results.

Concurrently, the diplomacy of the Allies was being rearranged on the axiom of a complete victory. The references to Austria-Hungary made by Mr. Lloyd George and the President during the winter had depressed the groups working for the " victoire intégrale." These groups had always been as radically anti-Hapsburg as they were anti-Hohenzollern. Their organ was The New Europe, and they made it the one most indispensable periodical in the English-speaking world. Its contributors were gathered from all parts of Europe, and many of them were themselves leaders in the work by which Allied and American diplomacy was turned during 1918 from the policy of compromise with Austria to that of dismemberment. Masaryk, Benes, Trumbic, Steed, Seton-Watson and others led the way with a skill, an expert knowledge, and a vision which made the rest of us their pupils and their debtors.

Their task was to form a working partnership between the nationalist forces of Central Europe and the Allied cause, to disrupt middle Europe from within while the German army was held and finally beaten in France. They realized before most of us that the apparent strength of Prussian Germany had the fatal weakness of reposing upon the subjugation of smaller peoples through the alliance with German Austria and the Magyar oligarchy. They knew that the destruction of absolutism meant the break up of that military and bureaucratic alliance through which these nations were held down. And they knew equally well that once this power was wrecked it would be necessary to rebuild the whole diplomatic structure of Europe.

In 1918 they set about wrecking it. Once the decision was taken to fight the war to a conclusion many men came to their assistance who were not primarily interested in the freeing of the nations. Thus they were able gradually to convince the statesmen of the west that the encouragement of rebellion would be an important military factor in the final result. But before an alliance with these nations could actually be realized a formidable series of diplomatic obstacles had to be overcome. The full story of the manoeuvres by which this was partially achieved in 1918 is an intricate tale, and all the facts are as yet unrevealed.

But the main outlines are known and can be told: Two nationalities had strategic importance—the Czecho-Slovaks and the Jugo-Slavs, both because of their geographical position, their internal strength, and the definiteness of their aspirations. The Czecho-Slovaks were known to be one of the best educated and most trustworthy peoples in the world —politically as mature as any nation on the continent. They had moreover a most important advantage over the Jugo-Slavs; their territory did not touch Allied territory at any point, and there was no Allied group of any significance interested in thwarting them. The case of the Jugo-Slavs was complicated by their territorial conflict with Italy, and by the internal difficulty arising out of dynastic jealousies at the court of the Serbian kingdom.

The problem soon narrowed itself to the status of the Jugo-Slavs. If that could be adjusted the Allies would have as allies the two nations of Central Europe through whose lands ran the chief arteries of the German-Austrian system. But the Jugo-Slav question turned on the validity of the Treaty of London which was the price of Italy's participation in the war. Would Italy renounce those portions of the treaty which assigned to her lands inhabited by Jugo-Slavs? If she would, Austria would soon be out of the war. If she refused untold complications faced the Allies. For ethnic justice to the Southern Slavs became the touchstone of Allied sincerity, and every small nation watched the diplomatic debate anxiously for evidence as to whether any one of the major allies would yield annexationist claims for the sake of the principles they all professed.

England and France could not officially press Italy to accept a revision of the treaty because they had signed the treaty. America was hesitant and

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at first not particularly well informed, while the more important figures in the embassy at Rome were, as so often happens to American embassies abroad, very much under the influence of fashionable chauvinism at the capital. The policy adopted by the reformers was shrewd, and inspired by a genuine devotion to the larger interests and honor of Italy. They set about inducing Italy herself to take the leadership in cementing the alliance between the Austrian nationalities and the Entente. The first step was the pact concluded on March 7, 1918, between Dr. Torre, representing a committee of the Italian Parliament, and the Jugo-Slav leader, Dr. Trumbic. Italian liberals within the Chamber of Deputies and in the press well understood the peril to Italy and to Europe of Baron Sonnino's insistence upon his pound of flesh. They cooperated loyally, and in early April the Congress of the Oppressed Nationalities of Austria-Hungary was held in Rome. The resolution of that Congress demanded the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary by the "constructive liberation" of the oppressed Austro-Hungarian nationalities. The Italian Premier blessed the deliberations. The result was highly important in Central Europe; it made Vienna furious and fearful. Italy's action, however, was not altogether official, for the Treaty of London had not been renounced. At the end of May the United States recognized the aspirations of the subject peoples, but the language employed was vague, and at the Versailles council of early June Baron Sonnino refused to assent to the complete recognition of the Jugo-Slavs, taking refuge behind Mr. Lansing's obscurity. Nevertheless, the result had been sufficient to cause the disaffection of Slav troops, and the offensive on the Piave in June was materially weakened by the propaganda of the Allies. At the end of June Mr. Lansing cleared up the obscurity, and definitely stated that the liberation of these peoples was an American war aim.

In August, under the influence primarily of Lord Northcliffe and Mr. Wickham Steed, another attempt was made to induce Baron Sonnino to recognize the claims of the Jugo-Slavs. This precipitated a violent political controversy in Italy. At the same time Great Britain and the United States formally recognized the Czecho-Slovaks as belligerent allies. This action caused dismay in Vienna, and was the cause of the postponement of peace proposals, which finally came from Austria a month later. For Austria had determined early in August to ask for peace, and had secured the consent of Germany following the success of the Allied counter-offensive. The note was already drafted when Britain and America recognized the government of Masaryk, and by implication declared for the dismemberment of the Dual Empire. The argument of the Austrian note was based upon the speeches of January in which the integrity of the Empire was promised. The recognition of the Czecho-Slovaks made it meaningless, and so the delivery of the note was delayed until mid-September, when it was launched virtually unamended in a gesture of despair. At about the same time Italy issued an official communiqué recognizing Jugo-Slav aspirations, and the Allied world waited for an Italian offensive against the disintegrating Austrian troops.

During the summer, the diplomatic campaign had been extended to Bulgaria. It is not generally known just what was the character of the secret manoeuvres which led up to the success of Franchet d'Esperey's attack in Macedonia, though the disaffection of Bulgaria had been prophesied ever since the fall of Radoslavov and the visits of Ferdinand to Germany. Some spoke knowingly of the cavalry of St. George. At any rate with the fall of Bulgaria the resurrection of Rumania became possible, and Hungary was in peril. Then the Ukraine revolted against the foraging detachments, and at that moment Mr. Wilson made the sensational speech of September 27, which was read in Germany during the first days of October.

This speech with its extraordinary moderation coincided with the first successes of the American army between the Argonne Forest and the river Meuse. That gigantic battle had as its purpose the defeat of Ludendorff's plan to retreat to the Meuse, to establish a new defensive line for the winter and negotiate peace from behind his defenses. When the opening phase of the American attack carried through the first three positions Ludendorff demanded an armistice, and the government of Prince Max was called upon to accomplish it.

IV. "The Natural Master of the House"

MAX did what Austria had tried to do a few weeks earlier. He tried to secure peace as of January instead of October. And though in form the armistice was signed on that basis, in reality, the peace which is actually being made, must, because of the revolutionary events of 1918, differ radically from that which was contemplated when the Fourteen Points were written. After the military decision of late October, and in face of the Lorraine offensive which had been prepared and of the revolution within the Empire, Germany did in fact surrender as unconditionally as Austria. The only lasting significance of the armistice negotiations was the voluntary acceptance by the European Allies of a few negative obligations and certain general principles. The successive renewals of the armistice show that the first terms were dictated unconditionally.

The original armistice was prepared hastily; French views seem to have prevailed in its military features; British in its naval; and American in its political. In the Austrian armistice it appears that Italy was given a free hand, with the result that the line of occupation had a fatal resemblance with certain additions to the line of annexationist claims. The Treaty of London appeared at the decisive moment with renewed vigor.

November was a period of great anxiety. The victory had come swiftly. It had brought the necessity of reconstructing Europe externally and in-

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ternally. And almost everyone was dazed, tired, and suspicious. The most serious feature of all, to speak frankly, was an Anglo-American irritation in official circles, for the peace of the world depended upon a working partnership between the only two Powers which had the resources for a creative statesmanship. The President arrived at the very moment when common counsel was least, and national propaganda most evident. It was a time when the tendency was to pull apart, and get out of the war helter-skelter. The same weariness of mind which accounts for the President's address to Congress before sailing, the same individualism, was epidemic in Europe.

His presence soon changed the atmosphere, and by January America and Britain had ceased pinching each other, and were at work. The great unifier was the determination to make the League of Nations the basis of peace. For here was a task which reached beyond national vanity into the future. It was a task which lifted men's minds once again to the exalted aims which had consoled them for the war, and threw into a humane perspective the more immediate demands which had become so clamorous.

The Allied conference in Paris began in January to build peace in the only way that it could be built. Faced with a world in which government had disappeared over immense areas, in which the old diplomatic system was ruined, the statesmen were forced to start in by creating the tool with which peace could be administered. They knew that there are no final solutions to be had just now. A rigid treaty of peace cannot be written when there is no stable government anywhere east of the Rhine. No man knows what Germany is to be, nor Russia, nor the twenty odd nationalities of Eastern Europe and Nearer Asia. No man can possibly foresee, not even Mr. James Beck, what adjustments will be required in the years ahead; none can predict what revolution will do to the process and method of trade, nor does anyone know what will be the movements of immigration, or the condition of capital, or the character and policies of any government five years hence. There is a world-wide regrouping in progress. It cannot be controlled by agreement alone. It requires a continuing series of decisions, and a machinery for executing them, and that is the essence of the League of Nations.

It is a constitution of common action adopted by the stable powers in a period of unpredictable change. To suppose that the conference was merely fumbling with a vague future under the pressure of idealists is a complete misunderstanding. The truth has been stated by the man whose statesmanship has been one of the happiest resources of Europe and perhaps the decisive influence in the constitution drafted at Paris. This man is Lieutenant-General J. C. Smuts. In a pamphlet published the middle of December, 1918, he states the core of the matter as it confronts the Peace Conference:

"Europe is being liquidated, and the League of Nations must be the heir to this great estate. The peoples left behind by the decomposition of Russia, Austria, and Turkey are mostly untrained politically; many of them are either incapable or deficient in power of self-government; they are mostly destitute and will require much nursing toward economic and political independence. If there is going to be a scramble among the victors for this loot, the future of Europe must indeed be despaired of. The application of the spoils system at this most solemn juncture of the history of the world; a repartition of Europe at a moment when Europe is bleeding at every pore as a result of partitions less than half a century old, would indeed be incorrigible madness on the part of rulers, and enough to drive the torn and broken peoples of the world to that despair of the state which is the motive power behind Russian Bolshevism. Surely the only statesmanlike course is to make the League of Nations the reversionary in the broadest sense of these empires. In this débâcle of the old Europe the League of Nations is no longer an outsider or stranger, but the natural master of the house. It becomes naturally and obviously the solvent for a problem which no other means will solve."

V. The Covenant

IT is useless to discuss the covenant as if it were an abstract document snatched from the blue. It is an arrangement devised by men who knew the condition of things, knew that years of trouble are ahead, knew that no final settlement would be made now by mortal man, knew that Europe would revert to anarchy unless the governments of the world agreed to meet regularly, exchange information, make decisions together, and cooperate in the execution of the treaty. They understood that if each nation went its own way and the secret jealousies revived, if the old suspicions were allowed to fester in each foreign office and in each general staff, if heads of governments did not bind themselves to meet around a table and speak face to face, then there was little hope that the world could rise out of the prostration of the war.

They provided, therefore, first of all for the presence in one city of men who can speak for the governments. This in itself is of transcendent importance. For modern diplomacy cannot continue to transact its business through the machinery of embassies and state departments alone. No decision can be made on time, no discussion can take place without involved misunderstanding by the old method of scattered information and criss-cross correspondence between negotiators. You have only to read the dispatches of the Twelve Days which preceded the war to realize the paralysis which results from the lack of any one place where the great decisions of mankind can be centralized. If there is one method of insuring the irritation of ignorance and suspicion it is long distance telegraphic communication between the heads of governments. The mere act of committing ideas to paper for the scrutiny of biographers stiffens the mind and arouses the disastrous desire to pose nobly. There is little good humor in official dispatches; like most news-

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paper editorials, they are sick with infallibility, and there is nothing worse for the peace of the world than two infallible diplomats uttering strong sentiment at each other from opposite ends of a cable. Writing 'state papers,' for posterity, instead of doing business, is bad enough, but when you add to it the sheer nuisance of coding, decoding, and translating, with the correlative arts of cracking codes and listening-in, you have produced a very subtle engine of mischief.

Then, too, the atmosphere in which embassies exist invites intrigue. In each capital there is a little cosmopolitan village known as the diplomatic set where gossip is a means of social prestige, and whispering a delight. Few can resist the lure of a good 'inside' rumor, with all it implies of secrecy and knowing a perfectly tremendously awful lot. That is how diplomacy derives its false glamor. The ordinary business between nations may be difficult, it is nevertheless a concrete and practical business. But in the dinners and week-end parties of a capital that business is made into an artificial game for the titillation of a bored group of privileged people. By them it is refined and subtilized and screened in personality, as if the happiness of mankind were not at stake.

All this is complicated further by the employment of propaganda to manipulate opinion. During this war the deliberate manufacture of opinion both for export and for home consumption has reached the proportion of a major industrial operation. This is not the place, nor is it yet possible without breach of confidence to discuss international propaganda freely. But some day the technic must be investigated if the judgments of peoples are to escape persistent exploitation. When the story is told, it will cover a range of subjects extending from legal censorship to reptile press, from wilful fabrication to the purchase of writers, from outright subsidy to the award of ribbons. It will include entertainment, and a vast amount of stimulated snobbishness, and the right way of conducting sight-seeing tours. The art of befuddlement engages able men and draws large appropriations. There are in practically all countries Ministries of Befuddlement generally presided over by personal representatives of the leading statesman. What they emit makes unconfused dealing between nations most difficult.

It is necessary consequently to break through all this and establish a personal meeting of representatives. Two men doing business will write and write and write, and listen to what their friends say at the club, and what their wives heard from somebody else's wife, and go ever deeper into confusion. Unless they meet and talk it out, they never will catch up with each other's misunderstandings. So with governments, and that is why a league of peace cannot get along without a board of delegates and a standing committee as its executive. There is no other basis even with the best of intentions for common action and decent intercourse. If the nations are to work together responsible leaders must confront one another.

VI. A World Pool

AND if they meet, they cannot afford to appear in shining armor each morning after breakfast. For one thing the cost is prohibitive. To start in where the war had led us, to pile up heavy artillery, tanks, airplanes, gas, transports, dreadnoughts, submarines, destroyers for a war as great as the possibilities of science, is a proposal that no statesman in Europe dares to contemplate. That is left for theorists like Mr. Henry A. Wise Wood, and I suspect for him only in the absence of the tax bills. There cannot be another race of armaments —that is flat. There is no need to argue from reasons of humanity. Those who dream of renewing the competition, and contemplate calmly another war fought by our children, are impervious to such arguments, and no one need waste ink and breath trying to convince them. The argument does not lie between right and wrong, but between the possible and the impossible. The world cannot arm competitively.

Nor can it re-establish a balance of power unless the supreme madness descends upon the English-speaking peoples. I take it that the Treaty of Peace will contain provisions for the disarmament of Germany as a world power. As far as we can see into the future Russia will be militarily impotent, and nobody in his senses, I suppose, intends to arm Africa, or to permit any aggressive armament in Asia. There are in fact but two great states with the resources and the wealth for really modern munitions manufacture. These are the British Empire and the United States. The only possible way in which a *balance* could be created now is by putting these two powers up as the leaders of rival coalitions. If this idea is abandoned for the nonsense that it is, if Britain and America work out their common purposes, then such a preponderance of power is created as to make all notion of a balance impossible. An Anglo-American entente means the substitution of a pool for a balance, and in that pool will be found the ultimate force upon which rests the League of Nations. For if the united power of Britain and America—potential and actual—is wielded for the ends they now both officially profess, they are assured of the active assistance of the smaller nations everywhere. The reason for this is that they exercise a form of force—sea power—which is irresistible in conflict and yet cannot be used permanently to conscript and enslave alien peoples. Nor does it rest internally upon the existence of a large caste in control of a regimented population. Sea power can be all powerful without destroying the liberties of the nation which exercises it, and only free peoples can be trusted with great power. In spite of the comparison between navalism and militarism there are these fundamental differences between them, and they are appreciated by the world.

A question remains, which may be put in this fashion: What assurance is there that this pooling of force can be maintained in an emergency? The answer is that the covenant provides a procedure in

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disputes, the final object of which is to insure delay accompanied by publicity. It is a mechanism for airing quarrels in their earlier stages. Here is the ultimate guarantee upon which the whole project rests. It assumes as its working theory that democratic faith in regard to the causes of war, which says that aggression is the work of a minority; that the masses in no nation have anything to gain by conquest, and that the masses would refuse such wars if they had a chance to examine their pretexts, and put pressure upon their governments. This faith may be unfounded. It may be that there is a universal pugnacity which requires war for its satisfaction, and the League may in the course of time fail to keep the peace. Perhaps, but the peoples who to-day press against every government, and may to-morrow control them, hold this faith, and it has prevailed at Paris.

The most radical feature of the covenant springs from this faith.

"It is hereby also declared and agreed to be the *friendly right* of each of the high contracting parties to draw the attention of the body of delegates or the Executive council to any circumstances affecting international intercourse which threaten to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends."

That clause is the most precious in the whole document because it strikes so deeply at the isolation which breeds arrogance. It is by far the most revolutionary idea which could be introduced into the comity of nations, because a seal is put upon the truth that the peace of the world is a vital interest of all nations. The active forces of peace are released by it. According to this new doctrine it will not be necessary for any people, neutral in a dispute, to sit by helplessly and see a conflagration prepared which may burn down its own homes. It abolishes those alleged private quarrels which in the end involve everybody. It states flatly that America, for example, is not to remain mute while some diplomat fixes up a war in the Balkans which cannot be ended until two million Americans are on foreign soil. It says that international duelling is over, and that every nation can discuss the causes of a fight before the fight takes place. Above all it enables any government in the League to arouse the public opinion of the world wherever a condition appears which threatens the peace. The faith is that no quarrel can grow big enough to justify war when the peoples who must do the fighting know about it soon enough.

VII. Alternatives

REMAINS the question of our own adherence to the covenant. This is not to be answered easily, and I think we may well congratulate ourselves upon the appearance of a genuine and respectable opposition. It will insure a thorough examination of the whole problem and we shall enter the League, if at all, as a democratic people should.

It is necessary, therefore, to make a somewhat tedious analysis of America's position in the world as a result of the war.

Previous to 1900 the continent of Europe was divided into coalitions—the Triplice, consisting of Germany, Austria, and Italy, and the Dual Alliance of France and Russia. England still played the role of guardian over the balance of power. In the years leading up to the war, the aggressiveness of Germany grew with her power, and moved in two directions—towards Turkey across the Balkans, where it conflicted with Russian claims, and towards naval power where it threatened England's security. Gradually England was drawn away from mere guardianship, and forced to throw her weight to Russia and France. The balance tipped so far in favor of Germany that England's whole weight had to be thrown into the scales to right it. Even the defection of Italy, foreshadowed in the Tripolitan war, did not restrain the increasing aggressiveness of the Central Powers. So when the war began, Europe was divided into two coalitions of such nearly equal strength that three years of furious warfare failed to break the deadlock. In all this America was the neutral, and though the issue between the two coalitions involved the existence of small nations, and the survival of liberal governments, there was no body of considerable opinion which proposed to enter the war on those grounds alone.

It was only when Germany brought the submarine into use, and threatened to disintegrate sea power that Americans felt themselves menaced. There was no difference in principle here between Roosevelt and Wilson. Mr. Roosevelt would have gone to war when the Lusitania was sunk; Mr. Wilson went to war when diplomacy had failed to mitigate the submarine attack. Neither of them proposed to go to war before the submarine appeared. As President, Mr. Roosevelt would perhaps have protested against the violation of Belgium; Mr. Wilson to-day may feel that he wishes he had done it. But both, in fact, were driven to action only when the threat against sea power became real.

This is a very significant matter, for a response of this kind arises out of the deepest political interests of a nation. Both were American statesmen, and neither felt a real menace to American life until the control of the seas was endangered. The conflict came home to us, as the saying is, when the aggression reached the world's highways and struck at the basis of mastery by the naval powers. Then we entered the war, saying that the autocracy of Germany must be overthrown and the rights of democracy safeguarded. What we have perhaps not so clearly realized, and yet must realize, is that the protection of democracy, as we understand it, is built upon the joint administration of sea power by the British Empire and America. Our own Monroe Doctrine is built upon it from its inception to the present day. Though we often talk as if we were the only great power in the western hemisphere, as a matter of

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plain fact, we are the closest neighbors of the British Empire at every vital point. So habitual and so unobtrusive has this relation become that we almost forget its existence. But it exists mightily, and if we have enjoyed a century of immunity from European aggressions the real cause lies in the successful maintenance by England of a balance of power upon the continent. We have never had the navy or the army to enforce the Monroe Doctrine against a European coalition and it is a mischievous form of self-deception to proceed on the theory that the Monroe Doctrine has been respected simply because we willed it. It was a principle of English policy fully as much as ours, because the English realized that the security of the Empire over large areas was protected by it.

Now, after the most serious threat ever directed against sea power, Britain and America emerge the undisputed leaders of world politics. Their common purposes are irresistible, and the destiny of all governments is for the moment in their hands.

How that joint power shall be used is the heart of the world's problem. How then, shall it be used? There are some who would seem to favor a course by which we should find ourselves preparing for war with Britain. They do not say so publicly, to be sure, but they dream of supplanting Great Britain as mistress of the seas. That means war. They may not face the fact now, but it is a fact—sea power cannot be divided permanently. Britain may wield it; America, after a disastrous war might snatch it from her. The two together can wield it. But they cannot each wield parts of it for any length of time, because after a period of competition war seems preferable to perpetual menace. The control of the seas is so delicate and so fundamental that it is impossible to leave it in dispute. Naval competition makes naval war, not a probability, but a certainty.

Another school, realizing this and smacking its lips over the concentration of power under Anglo-American control, looks to a permanent alliance as the basis of a good headstrong foreign policy. Since America and Britain temporarily control the world's destiny, why not continue, and profit by it? This is the policy of imperialist alliance, and it leads straight to those very entanglements against which Washington warned the nation. A mere offensive and defensive alliance between two or three powers means in practice that each has to back the other's ambitions and mistakes. It is a method of whetting the worst appetites of each, and of committing both to all the troublesomeness of either. Such a policy would soon awaken against us first the jealousy and then the enmity of the excluded nations. The masses of the world are stirring; they will not long trust themselves to any selfish combination of powers, no matter how idealistic their present purposes may be. An alliance would be a temporary thing for there is too much disruptive energy in the world to tolerate it long.

There is only one other course, and that is to make Anglo-American sea power the nucleus of world organization, to guarantee its uses before the whole world, to bind ourselves in honor to employ it only for the security of all nations. That is what the League does. The actual ownership of power remains in British and American hands, but its uses are stipulated in a covenant. By this we avoid the dangers of competition and alliance, while retaining the possession of the necessary force against an emergency in case the League were destroyed. Anglo-American sea power, fortified by the abolition of neutrality, becomes the ultimate guarantor of the world's affairs. It is the force by which such liberties as we may devise are finally secured.

This is not the old isolation. There is no denying that. But so far as mortal man can see into an extremely perplexing future, this programme can if intelligently administered be made to serve the same ends. At the beginning of the nineteenth century we were a weak people and the neighbors of a string of weak republics which had just secured their independence. In Europe a great war had ended with the triumph on the continent of autocracies which hated republics and were resolved to crush them. Taking advantage of England's position and her liberalism President Monroe proclaimed the doctrine that this hemisphere must remain safe for democracy. Now, a century later, another great war has closed in which those autocracies are crushed and a string of weak republics has risen from their ruins. We stand as the richest and strongest power in the world, and our intervention decided the issue. In spite of our strength we have remained true to those very things which we proclaimed when we were young and weak. European peoples seeing this miracle, for miracle it is to the continental mind, have turned to us with such faith as was never before given to a distant people. They have heard an American president announce their liberation and promise their safety, and while the war was engaged they heard no dissent because in fact there was none. They have taken his word as America's, and built their hopes upon it.

Perhaps it was wrong of him to arouse such expectations. Certainly it would have been wiser if he had acted less singly in committing the nation. But nevertheless, there was opportunity to object, and no formal objection was made. Our honor is consequently very seriously involved in the President's promises.

VIII. Amendments

IT cannot be asserted too often that the indispensable action to be taken at Paris is to provide for a continuous meeting. Nothing else in the Twenty-Six Articles can be regarded as beyond the reach of criticism and amendment. Let it be agreed now, that in one form or another the contacts which exist shall not be broken, and it becomes not only possible but desirable that the covenant should be subjected to drastic examination. Revision need not delay the making of the Peace Treaty, because the

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Congress of Versailles—if it does not adjourn—can adequately perform the immediate tasks of the League. For at bottom the League is merely the conference made permanent, and the conference is quite competent to make the necessary decisions of the next half a dozen months, while a more adequate instrument is provided out of the provisional text contained in the Twenty-Six Articles.

The document itself exhibits all the marks of haste and patching. General principles, agencies, procedure are scattered through the various articles in considerable confusion, and one has to search through most of the covenant to discover the complete doctrine on any specific point. For example, why having read Articles VII, VIII, and IX on the subject of armaments, does one suddenly discover another provision on the subject in XVIII? What is the meaning of "freedom of transit and equitable treatment" in XXI, and how does it relate itself to X where "political independence" is guaranteed? Does this same X mean that the boundaries to be fixed at Versailles are immutable, or simply that they cannot be changed by threat of war? Does this X mean that if a state once member of the League collapses through misgovernment the mandatory principle cannot be applied to it?

Apart from these general and technical difficulties there are certain specific criticisms to be made.

The covenant is very difficult to amend. Now an organic law which is virtually unchangeable should not burden itself with those abstract negative principles, which are the refuge of obstructionists. Article X, guaranteeing territorial integrity and existing political independence, is of this type. It is an article of distrust, an effort to be wiser than the next generation, and to curb the action of the future by a magic set of words. Contrast it with Article XI, which makes it a "friendly right" to draw attention to circumstances which threaten peace and understanding. X binds the League in a formula; XI releases the League for an active policy of conciliation. The one is restrictive, the other permissive, and the two clauses bark at each other. X is one of those grand generalities behind which every opponent of change can barricade himself. He can always declare that anything he does not like is "external aggression" against his political independence, and there is always sure to be some nation ready to vote against a unanimous recommendation.

The clause will not protect a nation's independence against the kind of economic penetration which to-day constitutes the chief mode of conquest. But it will protect a government in bad practices and oppressions. It will hamper the honorable nations by ruling out interference; it will assist the dishonorable governments who have learned to manipulate affairs in a costume of legality. It may put minorities beyond the scope of the League's protection, and enforce the privilege of the oppressing state. Moreover, it puts a premium upon insincerity. In the actual conduct of human affairs there is an increasing limitation of political dependence resulting from the necessities of economic cooperation. Those necessities are stronger than any political axiom, and will prevail. But under Article X they will prevail in roundabout fashion and furtively. The framers of the covenant, and the majority of well-informed people do not believe that a state can do what it pleases within its own boundaries. In the future men will believe it still less, for they are discovering that "international relations" are after all nothing but the result of what goes on within the different nations. Surely at the end of this war it is perfectly clear that the "political independence" of empires like that of the Hohenzollerns, Hapsburgs, and Sultan is not something the world can afford to regard as beyond the jurisdiction of the League.

The Article should be revised. The preamble contains all that is valuable in it without setting up a piece of political dogmatism derived from the eighteenth century. Provided that international law is given binding sanctions, it is not the business of this generation to put the substance of that law in a straitjacket. When we have agreed that law is binding we have given all the necessary guarantees. What the law is to be in specific cases must be determined on the facts as they are developed by events. There is every reason to believe, for example, that sooner or later the world will require a far greater regulation of international trade than anyone has yet dared to suggest. The experiences of the war point that way. They indicate the impossibility of permitting unfair trade practices between supposedly friendly nations, or of profiteering by governments, or the use of monopolies as a means of conquest. The conferees at Paris have avoided these matters in the draft. Perhaps they had to. But statesmen in the future may not be able to avoid them, and it is the part of wisdom to eliminate any dogmatic rule now which might exclude such action.

If the covenant is to serve through the perils that confront the next generation, flexibility and the possibilities of growth must be assured. To attempt, in the organic law, to go beyond "instruments" to legislation is to turn our back upon a century of experience with written constitutions. No printed text can govern the energies of a generation, but it can stifle the more inventive but scrupulous minds. When we have accepted the League we intend to abide by its spirit and its letter; let us not, then, tie ourselves up in the presence of those who may use the letter of it to defeat the spirit. That we can do by eliminating the negatives.

We can do it also by enlarging the "instrumentalities." The President's own experience shows how necessary it is to secure the intimate cooperation of executive and legislature, majority and minority, if the action of the League is not to be balked. No meeting of executives alone is sufficient to bind the nations, and it is a stultification of democratic control to erect a structure on the theory that the legislature will accept the commitments of the executive

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after they are made. In parliamentary countries the ministry will fall if its representatives make commitments of which the legislature disapproves. Under congressional government the result is likely to be a deadlock.

Inevitably, the mere act of securing agreement under the machinery of the League is impossible unless the delegates are capable of speaking with assurance for their countries. And having spoken, having reached a complicated agreement, it is infinitely confusing to throw the whole business back to the legislature for revision. A disagreement between House and Senate is nothing to what a disagreement between the legislatures of many nations would be. The only solution apparently is to have the legislative branch participate in the original discussion, so that it is not confronted each time with an accomplished fact. To be sure, the whole legislature of every state cannot be at the seat of the League, but there is no obvious reason why delegates from its Foreign Relations Committee should not be present to consult with the executive and with foreign legislators to share the responsibilities, and advise during the course of the negotiations. Both the administration parties and the opposition parties would thus be on the ground, and the resulting commitment would have a surer basis.

Unless Congress is to abandon power over foreign affairs, except the power to obstruct, it will insist upon representation of the legislature in the structure of the League. Formally, this representation need be nothing more than advisory, but the advice should be in the course, and not at the end, of the negotiations. It is no question of trusting or distrusting Mr. Wilson. I trust him beyond any statesman in the world today. It is a matter of the future, when Mr. Wilson will be a private citizen, and when perhaps some other person will be in the White House who needs to be checked by Congress. Above all, it is a matter of downright democratic responsibility which the legislature cannot abandon, no matter how excellent a President may be. Finally, it is a necessity, as politics is managed today. No government on the continent of Europe is rooted deeply in the affections of the masses. Those who are now at Paris may not all be there a few months hence. No man knows who will rise to power. But this covenant is supposed to be a League not of governments but of nations, and that implies that the complexion of political parties must be represented. The opposition of today may be the government tomorrow. Surely it is nothing but commonsense to ask that the leaders of the opposition should remain in the closest personal touch with the affairs of the League.

The value of this participation does not end here. Everyone knows that even with the best will in the world, each legislature is enormously preoccupied with purely local affairs, and that its contact with international politics is meagre. Yet the texture of diplomacy is largely made out of the acts of legislatures. If the world is to have peace and understanding some means must be found of creating a community of feeling between parliaments. They should have ways of debating with one another as well as within their own chambers. The opposition, no less than the administration, should have direct access to that subtle but decisive information which can be obtained only by being on the spot. Had Mr. Lodge been in Paris, studying the confidential reports, and talking to responsible European officials, had he been made to feel that what he thought really matters, as it undoubtedly does, he would insensibly have tended to forget that his role was officially that of opposing what Democrats propose. And when he returned to Washington Republican senators would have listened to him as they will never listen to Mr. Wilson. In other words, it is necessary to expose the opposition to the same influences, and the same information, if any settled national policy is to emerge. What is true of Mr. Lodge is equally true of the extreme left. The irreconcilable radical is ever so much less irreconcilable when he can express himself and when he has to share responsibility. Now the irreconcilable radical is a very considerable person in the modern world, and once he becomes convinced that the League is a secret manipulation he will be equally convinced that it is a sinister manipulation. Deny him the chance to protest and to advise, he will certainly attack and condemn.

It will be difficult enough in all conscience to secure harmony in a League when half the world is socialist and the other half anti-socialist. By calling in representatives of the elected parliaments this schism can be modified and an indispensable bridge built between the conservative governments and the more radical masses. M. Clemenceau, for example, loves France, but he will never have the confidence of Socialist Europe, and anything he does is suspect to it. But M. Thomas also loves France; yet he can converse with socialists. Mr. Henderson can work for understanding in groups when Mr. Lloyd George can produce only a rhetorical explosion. So if the League is not to find itself marooned on the dry sands of irrelevance it should take steps to introduce into its own structure the conciliatory influence of the opposition parties.

Conciliatory they are, and I do not see how any sane person could wish them to be anything else. Senator Lodge talks menacingly about building bridges across chasms to anarchy, but unless the bridges to moderate radicalism are maintained anarchy will follow. For there is just one sure protection against those things which Senator Lodge and most of the rest of us fear. That protection does not consist in playing the ostrich, nor does it consist in losing your head and trying to stamp on those who wish to make life too decent to be the breeding place of anarchy. It consists in remembering the very wise remark of the British Prime Minister that he feared reaction more than Bolshevism. For everything depends on where you think the chasm is. If you think it begins at a line drawn sharply along the frontiers of Senator Lodge's mind, then I fear most of us will find ourselves on the other side of

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the chasm. But if you put that frontier far enough to the left so as to include that huge majority of men who want change, and are not yet blind with desperation, there is no reason to fear anarchy here. Bolshevism is extraordinarily easy to combat in a well-fed country, and its existence is a sign of disgraceful incompetence in the governing circles. Bolshevism arises only where rulers have made a botch of their duties, and one of the sure ways of making a botch of them is to close your mind to the loyal opposition.

IX. Bolshevism

THE League can be made the instrument by which the disrooted populations of the world may readjust themselves peacefully. It can be. It may not be. If there is not enough imagination and courage applied to the policies for which the instrument is used, it is altogether probable that the complete collapse of established authority will follow. It is entirely true that if authority is to be preserved and the transition controlled, the western powers will have to listen to those men whose minds are unpoisoned by their own fears and their own hates. The peril is too real for self-indulgence in the lazy repetition of war cries, and those who are really bent on preserving the order of the world cannot allow themselves to be silenced by those moral terrorists who are pretending to save civilization by dividing it.

The hope of world order today is confronted by the diminishing faith of vast masses of people, who have seen governments bungle, falter and send men uselessly to death. They have seen governments blinded by privileged groups and favoritism, and cowed by the forces of reaction; they are angry and fiercely distrustful. They have borne the pain of the most extensive calamity in human history, and they have little more to lose. They sit restlessly in awful judgment upon the Lodges of the world. Their theories are a tiny part of their true feelings. What holds them from almost universal despair and dissolution is a lingering hope that perhaps there is still enough generosity and mercy left in western statecraft to meet the issue. They are still turned, though skeptically, to the America which Wilson has described to them. For America did the incredible thing among governments. It fought without selfish purpose. It waged a clean war, and thereby made itself the strongest pillar of faith in authority standing intact in the world today. It is a terrifying thing rather than a cause of vanity that this should be so.

Americans did not plan to have thrust upon them such responsibilities as these. The army went humbly to the veterans of France. The American people intended to follow rather than to lead their Allies. But when the actual situation of Europe was revealed, they found their own diffidence a source of confidence in others. The goodness or badness of all this is a trivial question compared to the fact that it represents the truth about the world today, and a withdrawal by America from the position she occupies will be the signal for a European revolution.

The imminence of that revolution is the dominating thought of all men everywhere. Lenin and Liebknecht sit in the Council at Paris, and their voices are heard in every discussion. It is with them that the world is negotiating today for its own preservation. Those negotiations are watched intensely through the crevices of publicity which the Peace Conference permits. But cutting across this basic negotiation are a thousand strands of special claim and ambition to interrupt and entangle. Some one wants a piece of land, some one else wants to make money, another wants to work a little intrigue, and this stuff of the old diplomacy obscures vision, and distorts the proceedings. The direct business of the conference is to feed the world, set it to work, and reconcile its people. Whatever impedes that is fiddling for a disaster. Whatever prevents the existing governments in Europe from reestablishing normal life encourages those who say that the existing governments are damned and that there is no salvation in them.

The reason why Lenin may succeed is that the victors do not take seriously enough what he represents. They are frightened to be sure, they are even panicky, but they are not serious enough about the menace to be willing to subordinate every other consideration to the creation of a Europe which will be sterile to Bolshevism. They want to fight Lenin with one hand and use the other for their own purposes. They are repeating the error of those who wanted to win the war and at the same time continue to do business as usual.

Out of this desire arise those ingenious diplomatic futilities by which the old intrigue is to be maintained as a method of crushing the Bolshevist power. Having realized that the armies of France and Great Britain cannot be used to police Russia, and that the American people do not intend to bury half a million boys in a wilderness for ten years or so, the idea of direct military intervention has been abandoned, and for it has been substituted the fashionable phrase "sanitary cordon." The theory is that a dam is to be erected in the east of Europe consisting of Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, a Greater Rumania, and Jugo-Slavia, and statesmen representing these nations have actually been found who are willing to have their countries used as a dam. These new and fragile republics are to be erected between Bolshevist Russia, communist Hungary and Spartacide Germany. Then another dam is to be erected on the Rhine, and the whole thing guaranteed by an alliance with Great Britain and America disguised as a League of Nations.

This is a very dangerous bit of fooling. No one who knows anything of the internal conditions of the new states of eastern Europe can for a moment imagine that they will survive squeezed in between gigantic revolutions in both Germany and Russia. Those new states are fragments of destroyed empires, and

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each contains within itself problems that have all the seeds of disorder. Each one moreover is at least partially in the hands of men whose ideas reflect the old imperial system, with the result that there has been through the winter a tangle of little wars on the frontiers of all of them. One American observer returning in January from what was Austria-Hungary had accounted for eleven separate military campaigns going on in the sanitary cordon.

The motive for using these little states as the buffer of the world is clear. It is to evade the disagreeable necessity of effecting a reconciliation between the German people and the western nations. If the cordon can be made to stand up it is possible to keep Germany prostrate and to escape the danger to Europe if her people become desperate; the new states are to be an iron fence dividing two areas of Bolshevism from each other. This is a more complicated version of what was tried at Brest-Litovsk, the scheme there was to use these same border states as a buffer, and then to paralyze Russia by splitting off the Ukraine. The new version is to use these states as a buffer facing two ways, and to paralyze Germany by splitting off a Rhenish republic. It would require as its first condition the maintenance for an indefinite period of a huge army on the Rhine. With Germany in profound disorder, as it will be, if food is not given and factories set going and the burden of debt made bearable, the occupation of Germany would have to follow. For Bolshevism in both Russia and Germany would soon eat the heart out of Poland, Rumania, and Hungary where social conditions are already desperate. Now anyone who supposes that the populations of France and Great Britain will endure the human and economic cost of such an occupation is suffering from a severe case of reading nothing but censored news.

The plain fact is that the reconstruction of Europe requires an orderly government and a contented population in Germany. The very existence of the new states depends upon protecting their flanks against revolution. A moderate socialist republic in Germany, such as the Ebert government represents, is the only type of government in central Europe today which can make that part of the world immune against the disorder which is traveling westward. If what Ebert represents is a failure, if it cannot preserve Germany from dismemberment and a long economic bondage, then the only alternatives open are to restore the Hohenzollerns or to give up in desperation, repudiate all authority and obligation and go Bolshevist. Of the three possible Germanys —Junker, Ebert, or Spartacide, there can be no doubt that Ebert's is the one with which the world can best live at peace. But the persistence of Ebert depends entirely upon his ability to extricate Germany from her immediate troubles.

Now if this were the Last Judgment it would be quite plausible to think of the horrors of Belgium and France, to recall the exultation which accompanied the Lusitania's destruction, and to deny that it is desirable to extricate such a people from the damnation of its defeat. But the Congress of Versailles is not the Last Judgment; it is a meeting of statesmen to determine the future of mankind, and that freedom from responsibility for the future, as well as the omnipotence and omniscence of the Last Judgment are denied to them. They cannot damn the German people for all time, desirable as that might be, because German mothers bear German children. They cannot consign them to the hell they deserve, because the location of that hell will be the centre of Europe. They are limited to narrow choices among present day facts—to an economic and political reconciliation with the Weimar convention or the victory of the Spartacides. Moral reconciliation will come more slowly, and not altogether until a guiltless generation has grown to maturity. With the individual grown-up citizens of what was the German Empire the resumption of spiritual intercourse will always depend upon a preliminary discussion of the past.

But this feeling which will in varying degree govern the conduct of western peoples has no place in statesmanship. The business of that statesmanship is not to make a sanitary cordon, but a sanitary Europe. Having eliminated the dangers of a sudden Prussian revival by disarming the German nation for war their first concern should be to preserve a continuous area of stable democracy to the frontiers of Bolshevist Russia. That is the true way to protect France, both against the hypothetical peril of renewed aggression and the actual peril of revolution within the next few years. That is the true way of dealing with Lenin's ambitions which will corrode an army, but are baffled by contentment.

With a settlement in Europe which weaves Germany and the new states into the texture of western commerce and political life, the League of Nations will have a basis in reality that it can never obtain by making a schism at the Rhine, and throwing little states out into the middle of the revolutionary torrent in order to stem it. For the creation of a solid area of liberal government under the aegis of the League is preliminary to the final problem of dealing with Lenin. The nations, with whose whole conception of society Lenin is avowedly at war, can go forward to deal with him successfully only when they have left no formidable discontent in their own rear. So long as the nations of the league are perforated with maladministration and loss of faith they are like an army advancing while its lines of communication are cut.

The perplexing thing about Bolshevism is that it is primitive. And being primitive it is formless, and has no vital center. You can kill a government by occupying its capital and a few of its chief strategic points. Bolshevism has no strategic points. It is a complete dissolution of centralized organization into local atoms of self-government. These atoms have to be stamped on one by one, because no one of them is profoundly dependent on the others. That is why the policing of Russia would require an enormous army distributed over its whole area. Now even if

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a sufficient army could be raised, which it cannot be, the discipline of that army would be most difficult to maintain. An army of occupation is a bored and discontented army and the more successfully it maintains order the more time it has to growl against the politicians and wonder when it will be allowed to go home. Moreover, no government established by an army of occupation is likely to last after the army goes because it bears the stigma of being the creature of the invading alien. The odium of all the privations which occurred during the occupation is upon it, and it is the experience of this war at least that an administration set up by the conqueror has to be escorted out of the country when the conqueror leaves.

It is possible to make war upon a nation organized under a government. There is no way of winning a war against several hundred thousand more or less independent villages. Yet that is the fundamental condition in Bolshevik Russia today. All the ordinary rules of warfare are inapplicable. And because of this, the ordinary short cut of force instead of negotiation is inapplicable. The process of reintegration cannot be pushed fast because all the ties of habit upon which government rests are torn. It is not possible to bully Russia into order, nor to curse her into it. She will have to be drawn into it by reestablishing the bonds of economic interdependence between her fragments and the organized society of the west.

To this end a suggestion might perhaps be offered. As a preliminary to the withdrawal of the Allied forces now operating in various parts of Russia, agreement should be reached both with the local soviets and with the Central Soviet at Moscow that certain ports of the Arctic, the Baltic, the Black Sea and the Pacific should be constituted international cities under the administration of bodies appointed by the League of Nations, and including for this purpose representatives of the local and central Soviets. The policing of these ports would be by naval forces including marines authorized by the League. In these ports economic commissions representing the League would be set up with authority to make trading agreements with any soviet cooperative society, trade union or corporation that could give the necessary guarantees. The failure to uphold the guarantees would be followed by boycott of the particular offender. These commissions would sell the goods imported by and exported for an international trading corporation organized for the purpose by the nations having commercial resources for the enterprise. They could also distribute relief where the need existed without means of payment.

Now the raising of the standards of life resulting from this trading and from relief might gradually restore the contact of the Russian people with the outer world. And with contact would come that sense of the realities of government and business which is necessary to the revival of Russia. The relation would be delicate, and if mismanaged would certainly fail. If it were used to promote the counter-revolution, if these commissions were made the centers of anti-soviet intrigue, if in short the thing were done in bad faith, the experiment would certainly collapse. But if it were done humanely, tolerantly, generously, with a high sense that the Russian people too have a right to chose their own ways of life and obedience, it might well undermine the Bolshevist regime, and attach Soviet Russia to the world community. By permitting the members of the League actual observation of Russian affairs it might make unnecessary the spectacle of the United States Senate trying to inform itself about Russia by listening to tittle-tattle. By opening a commercial regime, it might avert the awkwardness of attempting diplomatic relations with a state that denies all the premises of international relationship. Finally it might prevent whatever danger there may be in the single exploitation of Russia by a resurrected Pan-Germany.

X. The Test

THE three problems presented by Germany, Russia, and the intervening border states, do not exhaust the perplexities which victory has brought to the victors. One has only to mention Turkey and China. But these problems do indicate how pressing and practical is the need for an international organization by which the world can be administered into an era of stability. No one who has grasped those problems as they press upon mankind can persist in the idea that peace consists in signing a treaty, shaking hands with the Allies, and returning home to gaze in rapt admiration at the Monroe Doctrine. I know this feeling quite well. I have shared it, and have wondered whether anything could be done with that jangle of memories which so often seems to be the mind of Europe.

Perhaps nothing can be done. Perhaps the memories and the appetites are too strong to save the world from a period of despair. Perhaps the men who are meeting so secretly in Paris are too much divided to use the instrument of cooperation which they have framed. We shall know soon whether they have made a peace upon which a League can operate. But they shall not be able to say that they failed because America failed them, and that the dishonor is hers. They shall not be able to claim that the peace of the world was shattered because the strongest and safest of all was too timid to help them. America's true policy in this day is to say to Europe: We shall stay with you and share the decisions of the future if you will make the peace we are asked to share, a peace that Europe will endure. But if you make it a peace that can be maintained only by the bayonet we shall leave you to the consequences and find our own security in this hemisphere. It will have to be a very bad peace indeed to justify any such action on our part, and nothing less than that would ever justify it.

WALTER LIPPMANN.

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